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BANK ON WE THE PEOPLE: WHY AND HOW
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IS RELEVANT TO
BIOBANKING
Chao-Tien Chang*

Abstract
Biobanks emerged in the early 2000s, and now facilitate scientific
research through the provision of resources for research that requires
a large scale of biospecimens and data. Biobank projects have also
become intertwined with complicated socio-economic initiatives to
boost economic development or to shape community identity. While
legislators continue to debate the ethical and regulatory challenges
associated with biobanks, the federal regulation over research
involving human subjects, the Common Rule, is based on a traditional
research model that fails to address the complex challenges unique to
biobanking. Through an examination of the proposed revisions to the
Common Rule concerning research using biospecimens and ethical
controversies regarding informed consent, privacy, ownership and
benefit-sharing, this article highlights a participatory aspect of
biobanking that calls for public engagement with respect to both ethics
and norms. Many biobank projects try to appeal to a sense of civic
engagement whereby citizens have rights as well as responsibilities
with respect to participation in collaborative scientific projects.
Domestic and international guidelines describe incorporating public
engagement with biobanking as an essential means of protecting
research participants and achieving good governance. International
experiences with various approaches of public engagement have also
proven that involving the general public is feasible. Moreover, the
principle of democratic deliberation, which was proposed by the
Presidential Commission for the Studies of Bioethical Issues to be a
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guiding principle for bioethics policy decisions, further underscores
the criticality of public engagement in biobanking.
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I. Introduction: Biobanks and We the People
After the completion of the Human Genome Project in the early 2000s,
numerous biobanks were established globally. A biobank is an organized
collection of human biological material, DNA, genetic samples, and associated data. Biobanks, especially large-scale ones, are usually considered to
be valuable pieces of infrastructure that can enable research in the fields of
medicine and biotechnology, and the consequent scientific developments
made therefrom could confer benefits on the entire community. The launch
of many large-scale biobanks was also motivated by a sense of nationbuilding because biobanks can preserve natural resources that can boost a
1
country’s bioeconomy or serve as the commons for exploring a nation’s
2
identity and serve a nation’s health and welfare. The biobank bubble that
inflated over the past 20 years has not yet burst. According to a market survey in 2018, the global market of biobanking was estimated to reach 74.54
3
billion USD by 2025 at a 4.5% compound annual growth rate , despite the
4
withdrawal of funding in a few countries. In light of technological developments with respect to storage and computation and the emergence of new
research methods such as genomic and big data, researchers using biobanks
have begun to integrate information from other databases as well. These research approaches highlight the value of biobanks: biobanks allow researchers to use accumulations of data and link these banked biospecimens with
health data.
While some biobanks gained public support because of their nationalistic aspects, growing international cooperation has diluted the nationalistic
aspect of biobanks. However, the success of biobanks depends on public
support and investment. Because these biobanks cannot operate without
maintaining a broad set of samples and data, they require continuous contribution from the general public; however, people have become more concerned about maintaining autonomy and ownership of their own data and
tissues. Additionally, the growing budgets necessary to sustain biobanks
have increased the importance of establishing transparency, accountability,
and public trust with respect to biobanking. Biobank projects today appeal
not only to people’s desires to make altruistic contributions to the advance-

1.
Robert Mitchell, National Biobanks: Clinical Labor, Risk Production, and the Creation of Biovalue, 35 SCI. TECH. HUM. VALUES 330, 333 (2010).
2.
See HERBERT GOTTWEIS & ALAN PETERSEN, Biobanks and Governance: An Introduction, in BIOBANKS: GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3, 7, 10 (Gottweis &
Petersen eds., 2008).
3.
Biobanks Market Size Worth $74.54 Billion by 2025, CAGR 4.5%, GRAND VIEW
RES. (Sept. 2018), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-biobanksindustry.
4.
Don Chalmers et al., Has the Biobank Bubble Burst? Withstanding the Challenges
for Sustainable Biobanking in the Digital Era, 17 BMC MEDICAL ETHICS, 2016, at 1, 2,
https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12910-016-0124-2.
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ment of medicine and public health but also to their sense of civic responsibility. For instance, the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI), launched in
2016, aims to understand diseases and develop preventive measures and
treatments by accounting for individual biological, behavioral, and envi5
ronmental differences. An essential project of the PMI, named All of Us, is
operated by the National Institute of Health (NIH) and seeks to assemble a
cohort of one million persons or more to create a large-scale biobank comprising biospecimens and databases containing various health data collected
6
from the participants. PMI highlights the concept of “participants as part7
ners,” which describes how people are empowered to have more active
roles rather than simply serving as voluntary subjects in need of protection.
The All of Us project and PMI’s mission statement suggest that citizens
have the right to access these resources and the right to determine how such
resources are utilized insofar as they are involved in governance once they
opt in; simultaneously, however, citizens also share a moral responsibility to
donate their biospecimens and data for the public good. Scholars have proposed similar ideas about the relationship between civic engagement and
opting in to such large-scale scientific cohorts, referring to the relationship
8
9
as “genomic citizenship” or “data citizenship.” Scientific citizenship mainly describes how people have rights and responsibilities with respect to participation in sharing projects undertaken for scientific research, and people
should thus have the right to participate in the collective decision-making
process beyond just exercising individual rights.
Biobanks have presented a novel challenge to regulatory frameworks
that have been designed to address the ethical issues with respect to the use
of human research subjects; however, using banked biospecimens and data
are not necessarily within the scope of human subjects research if the biospecimens and data have been de-identified. Moreover, given that biobanks
are designed to facilitate general future research, voluntary participation is
usually confirmed through broad consent; however, broad consent is ethically questionable because participants have the ability to exercise very limited
real control over biospecimens and data. Interlinking of biobanks and other
data may lead to breakthroughs in medicine but may also create the potential for unprecedented endangerment of autonomy and privacy. Despite ef5.
About the All of Us Research Program, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
https://allofus.nih.gov/about/about-all-us-research-program (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
6.
Id.
7.
PMI WORKING GROUP, THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE COHORT
ST
PROGRAM—BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR 21 CENTURY MEDICINE 39 (Sept. 17,
2015), https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-workinggroup-report-20150917-2.pdf.
8.
Maya Sabatello & Paul S. Appelbaum, Rising Genomic Citizens: Adolescents and
the Return of Secondary Genomic Findings, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 292, 293-94 (2016).
9.
Barbara J. Evans, Power to the People: Data Citizens in the Age of Precision Medicine, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 243, 243 (2016).
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forts to establish ethical and legal regimes for biobanks both domestically
and internationally, the aforementioned ethical issues remain to be settled.
Further, because of the considerable number of participants and financial
investment that biobanks require, their creation and maintenance also face
issues of democratic legitimacy and accountability.
In response to these challenges, many biobank projects made a participatory turn. Public engagement has become a common practice for biobank
operators, and an increasing number of calls have been made for biobanks
to engage in a dynamic, continuing relationship with participants through
the use of information technologies. The participatory turn resonates with
the idea of scientific citizenship, which describes the perspective of many
large-scale biobanks today that assume citizens have rights as well as responsibilities with respect to participation in communal efforts to achieve
public interests. However, the participatory turn was not addressed in the
10
Belmont Report or the four key bioethical principles. Bioethics emphasizes individual autonomy, but has seldom addressed citizen participation in
governance or in community decision-making. In the context of biobanking,
“We the People” are not just research subjects but are possessors of genomic sovereignty on the basis of which we define justice, domestic tranquility, general welfare, the blessings of liberty, and obligations to posterity.
Public engagement, as an approach to realizing popular sovereignty, is crucial to achieve the ethicalness and legitimacy of any biobank project
launched with the task of pursuing the public good.
Biobanks have made a significant participatory turn, but relatively little
scholarship regarding the laws and regulations of biobanks exists; thus, this
article explores the normative importance of public engagement in biobanking, and various models that can enable public engagement. Following Part
I’s introduction, Part II reviews the regulatory and ethical controversies of
biobanking. The Common Rule is the most relevant regulation, and its two
major mechanisms for protecting biobank participants are de-identification
and informed consent. Proposed revisions to the Common Rule considered

10.
The four widely recognized bioethical principles—respect for autonomy, nonmalefiecence, beneficence, and justice—were proposed by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress in their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, whose first edition was published in 1977.
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS vii, 13
(7th ed. 2013). The four principles share certain similarities with the Belmont Report’s three
general principles relevant to human subjects research—respect for persons, beneficence, and
justice, NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (THE BELMONT REPORT) Part B (1979),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf. The most
significant difference between the two is the scope of application: while the Belmont Report is
a document specifically addressing human subjects research ethics, Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles are designed to apply more broadly to general bioethical issues. See
Beauchamp & Childress, supra.
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bringing the secondary use of de-identified biospecimens into the scope of
human subjects research regulations as well as granting research subjects
the opportunity to give broad consent to enhance individual autonomy.
However, the proposal did not survive and was left out of the final version
that became effective in 2018 because of the assumption that seeking consent would impose a significant burden on biobanks and the fact that broad
consent presents debatable ethical concerns. This article contends that the
Common Rule, which was based on an assumption that specific research is
performed on human bodies, did not adequately address the challenges of
regulating biobanking. Part III assesses three major areas of ethical controversy relating to biobanking—(1) informed consent, (2) privacy and confidentiality, and (3) ownership and benefit-sharing. The discussions concerning these three areas of controversy reveal a trend whereby participants are
empowered to take on more active roles instead of being relegated to the
status of passive subjects to be protected. Part IV addresses the relevance of
public engagement to biobanking by reviewing ethical reasons as well as
normative evidence in support of public engagement. The ethical aspects of
the communal features of biobanking have inspired calls for public engagement. Involving the public can help ensure that the operation of biobanks
fulfills the common good, can serve as a method for implementing good
governance, and can reinforce public trust. Domestic and international
guidelines regarding biobanking have also added public engagement as a
key element of ethical practices, all normatively confirming the necessity of
public engagement. Part V examines international experiences with public
engagement and categorizes them into four models. The various strategies
to include and empower the public in different countries, despite their advantages and disadvantages, confirm an international consensus that public
engagement in biobank governance is both feasible and desirable. This part
also responds to critiques of public engagement, which are mostly based on
administrative costs and people’s participatory competence. Part VI concludes the article and argues that the relevance of public engagement can be
also supported by the emerging bioethical principle proposed by the Presidential Commission for the Studies of Bioethical Issues (PCSBI)—
democratic deliberation. Democratic deliberation highlights the importance
of public engagement, which resonates with the participatory turn in biobanking elucidated in this article.

II. Regulation of Biobanking
Two different paradigms exist for biobank regulation. One relies on
current regulations and results in the governance of biobanking by a variety
of complicated and even sometimes conflicting rules. The other paradigm
articulates a specific regulatory framework for biobanking. The United
States’ regulatory regime takes the first approach. The most pertinent feder-
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al regulation is the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects Research (known as “the Common Rule”). However, applying the Common
Rule to biobanks is problematic because the Common Rule does not address
the particular characteristics of biobanking activities. Proposed revisions to
the Common Rule once sought to broaden the scope of human subjects research to include the secondary use of de-identified biospecimens and mandate the solicitation of research subjects’ broad consent to protect their autonomy. However, the proposed expansion to the scope of human subjects
research to include de-identified biospecimens was ultimately not adopted.
The unsuccessful revision of the Common Rule seems to indicate the necessity of seeking alternatives for appropriately regulating the ethical issues of
biobanking.

A. Regulation Overview
The Common Rule is a set of regulations adopted independently by different federal agencies, among which the most well-known is the Human
11
and Health Services (HHS) regulation codified as 45 CFR 46, part A. The
Common Rule regulates research funded by federal agencies or conducted
in institutes that agree to assume responsibility for the research in accord12
ance with the Common Rule regardless of the source of funding. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) also adopted certain provisions of the
Common Rule that apply to clinical investigations regulated by the FDA, or
clinical investigations that support new product applications or product
13
marketing. The Common Rule was promulgated in 1991 and had mostly
14
remained unchanged since then. Nevertheless, challenges raised by the
new technology brought the necessity for revision in order to provide adequate protection for research subjects. HHS published an Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in Federal Registrar in 2011, and later
15
HHS published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) in 2015. After
16
receiving more than 2100 comments, the final rule implementing major

11.
1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE, 27 (1999),
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/hbm.pdf [hereinafter NBAC]; Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
12.
NBAC supra note 11, at 28; 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2018).
13.
See NBAC supra note 11, at 27-28; 21 C.F.R. § 56.101 (2018).
14.
Victoria Berkowitz, Comment, Common Courtesy: How the New Common Rule
Strengthens Human Subject Protection, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 923, 925 (2017).
15.
Revised Common Rule, OFF. FOR HUM. RES. PROTS., https://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/finalized-revisions-common-rule/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
16.
Jerry Menikoff et al., The Common Rule, Updated, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 613,
613 (2017).
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revisions to the Common Rule was formally announced in January 2017 and
17
took effect in 2018 (Final Rule).
The first challenge of applying the Common Rule to biobanks is that the
use of human biological materials does not necessarily fit into the scope of
the Common Rule. To start, the Common Rule only applies to research involving human subjects, while research activities involving biobanks do
necessarily fall within the scope of human subjects research. Human subjects research is defined as that involving a living individual about whom an
investigator conducting research obtains (1) data through intervention or in18
teraction with the individual, or (2) identifiable private information. Human subjects research by this definition must undergo review by an institutional review board (IRB) and acquire subjects’ informed consent by
19
disclosing required information. Based on this definition, when an investigator interacts with a subject to obtain his or her samples or data, it qualifies
20
as human subjects research.
However, the problem is the use of banked samples and data. Working
with stored samples and data is defined as human subjects research only
when those samples and data are identifiable private information. The definitive characteristic of “identifiable information” is that “the identity of the
subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated
21
with the information.” Guidance issued by the Office for Human Research
Protection (OHRP) deems information not to be identifiable when the specimens or data cannot be linked to specific individuals by the investigator di22
rectly or indirectly through coding systems. According to OHRP’s interpretation, investigations using specimens or data from a coded repository
are not considered human subjects research if there is an assurance based on
certain agreements, policies or laws from the key holder not to release the
23
decoding key to investigators. By OHRP’s standard, a biobank could serve
as an efficient way of sharing as the key holder, as long as the biobank
codes specimens and data and takes responsibility for ensuring compliance
with regulatory requirements.
Next, even if research activities fall within the scope of human subjects
research, they might be exempted from IRB review and other regulatory requirements as long as they are unlinked or not publicly accessible. According to the Common Rule, the exemption applies when the identifiable information is publicly available, or the information “is recorded by the

Revised Common Rule, supra note 15.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (e)(1) (2018).
45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2018).
NBAC, supra note 11, at 28.
45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (e)(5) (2018).
Office for Human Research Prots., CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR SPECIMENS
USE IN RESEARCH, GUIDANCE (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html.
23.
Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects cannot
readily be ascertained directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects,
the investigator does not contact the subjects, and the investigator will not
24
re-identify subjects,” or when a broad consent has been authorized by the
25
subjects when agreeing to opt in to the biobank. The criteria the investigator cannot acquire identifiable information of the research subjects is what
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) report refers to as
unlinked samples— “samples lack[ing] identifiers or codes that can link a
26
particular sample to an identified specimen or a particular human being.”
27
Typically, biobank operators send unlinked samples to investigators. Such
research is generally exempted from IRB review and other regulations, because it is unlikely that investigators, repository operators, or a third party
28
can identify particular individuals in research conducted on such samples.
Further, even if non-exempted human subjects research is conducted, it
could be eligible for an expedited IRB review or a waiver of the requirement to obtain subjects’ informed consent. The IRB review may be expedit29
ed as long as the research involves no more than minimal risk. The OHRP
is authorized to issue a list of categories of research eligible for expedited
review, including many forms of human biological materials, such as blood
samples drawn by minimally intrusive methods, or a prospective collection
of biological specimens gathered for research by noninvasive means, and
data collections resulting from noninvasive procedures routinely employed
30
in clinical practices. Research using biospecimens and data that have been
collected or will be collected for non-research purposes (such as medical
31
treatments or diagnoses) is also eligible for expedited review. Moreover,
the IRB could waive the informed consent requirement to non-exempt human subjects research if all of the following criteria are met: (1) the research
involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; (2) the research could
not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration; (3) the waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; (4) research can only be practicably carried out by using identifiable
private information or biospecimens; and (5) whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information after participa32
tion. The most critical criterion for a non-exempt protocol is usually
24.
45 C.F.R. § 46.104 (d) (4) (i), (ii) (2018).
25.
Id. § 46.104 (d) (8).
26.
NBAC, supra note 11, at 18.
27.
Id. at 58.
28.
See id.
29.
45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (b) (2018).
30.
Office for Human Research Prots., OHRP EXPEDITED REVIEW CATEGORIES
(1998), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/expedited98.html.
31.
Id.
32.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (f)(3) (2018). It is also worth noting that the Final Rule provides
an exception for the IRB waiver. If research subjects had been sought for broad consent for
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33

whether it involves “minimal risk.” According to the NBAC’s opinion, research using coded samples in the biobank is regarded as posing a minor
risk to subjects, provided that the biobank and the researcher protect the privacy of subjects and have an appropriate plan on disclosure of research find34
ings.

B. Proposed Revisions to the Common Rule
Applying the Common Rule to biobanks is not without challenges,
however. Identifiability is a key factor in this framework. The Common
Rule allows for a wider range of use and less-strict regulation on research
when the samples and data involved is de-identified. The underlying rationale is that research using de-identified materials hardly hurt subjects.
Nevertheless, criticisms of the standard of identifiability arise in terms of
both technology and ethics. Reforms towards safeguards based on deidentification could be found in ANPRM and NPRM. Despite that the proposed revisions were not adopted in the Final Rule, it is worth reviewing
those proposals when examining how the Common Rule protects research
subjects in the context.
The technological challenge is that re-identification will become more
likely, as biobanks proliferate, store and share ever larger amounts of information. Re-identification usually requires identified or “reference samples,”
35
and biobanks make these samples more widely available. Some research
has proven the possibility of identifying an individual from a sample, even
when specimens and data are anonymized. A Science article in 2013 described how to “google” identities of anonymized samples in genetic studies
36
using little more than Internet sleuthing. Perfect de-identification seems
hardly achievable when biobanks are designed to build massive collections
of networked information.

secondary research use of identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens but
refused to consent, then the IRB could not waive consent. Id § 46.116 (e).
33.
See NBAC, supra note 11, at 31.
34.
Id. at v (“Recommendation 10: IRBs should operate on the presumption that research on coded samples is of minimal risk to the human subject if: a) the study adequately
protects the confidentiality of personally identifiable information obtained in the course of
research, b) the study does not involve the inappropriate release of information to third parties,
and c) the study design incorporates an appropriate plan for whether and how to reveal findings to the sources or their physicians should the findings merit such disclosure.”).
35.
See Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 SCIENCE
370, 370 (2006).
36.
See generally Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname
Inference, 339 SCIENCE 321, 321-24 (2013) (describing a study finding that the anonymity of
genome sequencing could be breached by comparing anonymized data with publicly accessible genetic genealogy databases that could identify surnames of the subjects, and then combining the information of surnames with other metadata such as age or residency of state).
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In addition, the ethical challenge is whether the benefits of using anonymized specimens and data outweigh the principle of respect for autonomy.
The Common Rule has treated de-identification (and even codification) as a
37
sufficient and acceptable alternative to subjects’ informed consent. However, the public does not necessarily agree. For instance, in Beleno v. Lakey,
parents sued the state government, which had collected and stored newborn
samples and subsequently made them available for undisclosed research
38
purposes without obtaining parents’ consent. The plaintiffs alleged that
they had suffered a violation of privacy even though specimens had been
de-identified, arguing that de-identification did not cure the defect of failing
39
to obtain consent initially. This case resulted in an out-of-court settlement
40
that called for the destruction of more than 4 million collected specimens.
De-identification in itself does not provide an adequate ethical foundation
for research subjects to surrender their autonomy. Another problem is the
lack of oversight in the use of purportedly anonymous material: research indicates that researchers using human tissue samples without consent or IRB
approval are more likely to use samples in an identifiable form rather than
41
in the properly anonymized form.
The NIH’s Genomic Data Sharing Policy (GDS Policy) represents a
significant shift towards requiring informed consent for the use of de42
identified biospecimens and data. To encourage data sharing that fosters
genomic research, NIH requires all of its funded researchers who conduct
genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and other genomic research to
submit their de-identified studies to the NIH database, Genotype and Pheno43
type (dbGap). In 2014, the NIH announced the GDS Policy, which applies
to all funded researchers who generate large-scale human and nonhuman
genomic data and the use of these data for subsequent research and imple-

37.
Katherine Drabiak-Syed, State Codification of Federal Regulatory Ambiguities in
Biobanking and Genetic Research, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 299, 320 (2009).
38.
See Complaint at 3-4, Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No.
5:09-cv-00188).
39.
See id. at 6.
40.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND
PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 49 (2012), https://bioethicsarchive.
georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/PrivacyProgress508_1.pdf [hereinafter PCSBI I].
41.
Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Legal Regulation of Biobanking Newborn Blood Spots for
Research: How Bearder and Beleno Resolved the Question of Consent, HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y, 2011, at 1, 43 n. 235 (referring to Jon Merz et al.’s research indicating that of 13
studies performed without informed consent and IRB approval, only 3 used nonidentifable
samples).
42.
See Donna M. Gitter, Informed Consent and Privacy of Non-Identified Biospecimens and Estimated Data: Lessons from Iceland and the United States in an Era of
Computational Genomics, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1277-78 (2017); NIH Genomic Data
Sharing, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, https://osp.od.nih.gov/scientific-sharing/genomic-datasharing/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
43.
See Gitter, supra note 41, at 1278.
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44

mented it in 2015. In light of the development of reidentification technology that can cross-reference information from various sources, the GDS Policy requires researchers to obtain research participants’ consent for broad future use and general sharing of data, even if biospecimens and data have
45
been de-identified. Before the GDS Policy, a study of research participants
whose de-identified data were submitted to the dbGap also indicated that
most surveyed participants placed a high degree of importance on having
their consent sought even for the use of de-identified data, and most of them
46
(90%) had consented to share their data with dbGap. The GDS Policy reflects a different paradigm from the Common Rule, acknowledging the insufficient protection offered by de-identification and calling for strengthening research participants’ autonomy.
The ANPRM and NPRM reflected similar concerns as the GDS Policy.
One of the major changes proposed in the ANPRM, followed by the NPRM,
was how to treat the secondary use of de-identified biospecimens. The
ANPRM asked whether prior consent should be required when investigators
use de-identified biospecimens, and if consent was required, whether such
47
consent could be obtained for unspecified future research. Noting that biospecimens are intrinsically identifiable because of the genetic information
they contain, the ANPRM proposed that investigators who use biospecimens not be required to seek informed consent prior to its collection, re48
gardless of whether it is identifiable or not. In addition, the ANPRM proposed a loosened standard for informed consent under which consent need
49
not be study specific.
The NPRM advanced a similar proposal as the ANPRM and called for
expanding the definition of human research subjects. The NPRM proposed
that “the obtaining, use, study, or analysis of biospecimens . . . be covered
50
under the Common Rule, regardless of identifiability.” The NPRM also
suggested that broad consent be permissible for unspecified future research
rather than research using biospecimens be required to solicit consent spe-

44.
See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH GENOMIC DATA
SHARING POLICY 1-2 (Aug. 2014), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/NIH_GDS_
Policy.pdf.
45.
Id. at 5; Gitter, supra note 42, at 1278-79.
46.
Evette J. Ludman et al., Glad You Asked: Participants’ Opinion of Re-Consent for
dbGap Data Submission, J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 2010 September, at 1, 6,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3071850/pdf/nihms279224.pdf.
47.
Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512,
44515, 44526-27 (proposed July 26, 2011).
48.
Id. at 44526-27.
49.
Id. at 44515, 44526-27.
50.
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53933, 53944
(proposed Sept. 8, 2015).
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cific to each study. In addition, even if the Common Rule’s expansion
would not have been so broad as to cover all research using biospecimens,
the NPRM also proposed two relatively minor expansions to include certain
types of research: Alternative A proposed including Whole Genome Sequencing in human subjects research and Alternative B proposed including
52
research that generates bio-unique information. Another key proposal of
the NPRM was broad consent in light of the broadened scope of human subjects research in research using all biospecimens. By balancing the protection of research subjects and the public interests of research, the NPRM
suggested that broad consent be permissible for the storage or maintenance
of biospecimens and identifiable information for secondary research; the
secondary use of stored biospecimens would also have been permissible
53
with research subjects’ broad consent and sufficient privacy safeguards.
The NPRM also outlined the elements that would have been required to be
54
contained in broad consent.
Nevertheless, the Final Rule only adopted broad consent for identifiable
biospecimens and did not expand the scope of human subject research to include de-identified biospecimens because of strong objections to the NPRM
contained in public comments received. Commenters expressed concerns
that the change would create significant administrative burdens because investigators would have to re-identify existing samples in order to seek con55
sent. Commentators also argued that the burden of seeking consent would
significantly impair investigators’ abilities to undertake important re56
search. Conversely, the benefits of seeking consent seemed to be too minimal to offset the costs and harms. Many commenters opined that broad
consent was ethically questionable. Research subjects would have no way to
57
fully consent given the limited information about future research. Broad
consent would not stimulate real dialogues between investigators and research participants but would rather reduce the likelihood of research sub58
jects making fully informed decisions concerning the use of biospecimens.
Nevertheless, the Final Rule permits broad consent for the secondary use of
59
identifiable biospecimens and information. According to the old Common
Rule, most investigators, considering the cost of seeking re-consent when
using identifiable materials, would choose de-identification to exempt from

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 53973.
Id. at 53945-46.
Id. at 53973.
Id. at 53973-74.
Berkowitz, supra note 14, at 956-57.
Id.; Menikoff et al., supra note 16, at 613.
Berkowitz, supra note 14, at 957-58.
Id. at 958.
45 C.F.R. § 46.104 (d)(8) (2018).
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regulation or seek waiver from the IRB. In any event, many still believe
that the broad consent codified in the Final Rule still enhances research subjects’ autonomy by granting them more opportunities to make choices re61
garding the use of their data.
After the implementation of the Final Rule, the storage and maintenance of biospecimens and data require broad consent if they are identifiable. Investigators using materials from a biobank, however, are not mandated to seek consent either personally or through biobank operators because
banked materials are considered to be de-identified from the investigators’
view. Although the NPRM’s proposed change regarding de-identified biospecimens was not adopted, the NPRM’s reasoning is illuminating. Compared with the ANPRM’s focus on the potential identifiability of biospecimens, the NPRM appealed to public opinion and public trust. The NPRM
contended that the enterprise of publicly funded research is increasingly untenable because of concerns about research using de-identified biospecimens without seeking consent, which the majority disfavors because of the
62
effect on legitimate autonomy. The NPRM argued that it was necessary for
the research community to seek permission from the people providing bio63
specimens and data to build trust and partnership with the public. Further,
64
65
surveys referred to by the NPRM and related literature indicated that
people have a growing sense of entitlement to their materials and are willing
to actively exercise those rights.

III. Ethical Challenges and the Need for
Public Engagement
Based on abovementioned regulatory challenges, it could be found that
biobanks introduce unique ethical concerns that the Common Rule framework for human subjects research cannot completely address. In this Part, I
further examine three relevant ethical questions, all of which highlight the
challenges that biobanking poses to the current ethical framework. The current ethical framework has not been able to provide satisfying answers to
these challenges because it fails to consider the communitarian aspects of,
and the complicated socio-economic meanings behind, biobank projects.

60.
See Menikoff et al., supra note 16, at 615. However, the two options of not seeking
research subjects’ consent—de-identification or IRB waiver—remain to be available in Final
Rule. Id.
61.
See id.
62.
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53944.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 53938.
65.
Ludman et al., supra note 46, at 6; S.B. Trinidad et al., Research Practice and Participant Preferences: The Growing Gulf, 331 SCIENCE 287, 287-88 (2011).
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Further, a consensus towards empowerment of participants can be found
among discussion of these ethical debates.

A. Informed Consent
Biobanking brings ethical challenges to informed consent. Informed
consent requires disclosure of detailed information of research; however, it
is intrinsically difficult for any biobank designed for general future use to
66
specify all the research it will support in the future. Although an alternative model, broad consent, has been adopted by the Final Rule and other international laws, it remains to be seen whether the broad consent really pro67
tects the subjects. The new challenge to informed consent is a reason to
consider whether there are aspects not covered by the existing regulatory
framework.

1. Difficulties of Gaining Specific Consent and Alternatives
Specific informed consent is difficult because of biobanks’ nature as resources for uncertain future research. The trend of building large-scale databases, with interconnected biospecimens and data for sharing, only serves to
make the ultimate uses of materials more uncertain. Moreover, individual
scientists may not be able to disclose comprehensive information in an informed consent protocol. Because a wide range of scientific expertise is
brought to bear in biobank research, participating scientists may themselves
68
have only a partial understanding of the full scope of research. Further,
seeking specific consent for every research program or project is costly. A
strict informed consent standard may also hamper new research if important
studies are thwarted by not having biospecimens and data numerous or rep69
resentative enough.
In response to questions of specific consent, one solution is to loosen
the criteria of informed consent. Although there are some who hold that
specific consent should be required whenever using identifiable samples and
70
data, there are at least three alternatives with different degrees of authorization by participants: presumed consent, broad consent, and layered con-

66.
JANE KAYE ET AL., GOVERNING BIOBANKS: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY
BETWEEN LAW AND PRACTICE 291 (2012).
67.
See infra Section III.A.1.
68.
KAYE ET AL., supra note 65, at 290.
69.
See PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 91; BERNICE ELGER, Consent and Use of Samples,
in ETHICAL ISSUES IN GOVERNING BIOBANKS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 57, 59 (Bernice Elger
et al. ed., 2008).
70.
See ELGER, supra note 68, at 58-59 (exemplifying that a report made by the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) in 1996 contended that specific consent should always be required, including both prospective and retrospective studies, while the report explicitly stated blanket consent to be inappropriate).
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71

sent. The most general authorization is presumed consent. The Icelandic
HSD Act adopted this paradigm, which automatically enrolled existing
medical/healthcare data into the database and gave participants the choice of
72
opting out. This approach has attracted controversies for infringing on subjects’ autonomy. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the PCSBI report in
2012 also recommended presumed consent. The PCSBI report prefers the
opt-out model over an opt-in model, believing that both respect autonomy,
but the default of participation will increase the participation rate, and thus
73
benefit scientific and medical research.
74
The most widely accepted format is broad consent or blanket consent.
Broad consent means that participants are asked to consent to the use of
their materials for any future research, provided that the research is ap75
proved by an IRB or a research ethics committee. In the Final Rule, broad
consent is permitted only with respect to the storage, maintenance, or secondary research uses of identifiable private information and identifiable biospecimens, in an effort to balance subjects’ autonomy with practicability of
76
research. Broad consent in the Final Rule allows flexibilities on specifying
77
information when seeking consent from research subjects. Internationally,
the Human Genome Organization (HUGO) recognizes that blanket consent
78
should be allowed in some cases. The model of broad consent has been
79
widely adopted by many large biobanking projects. Broad consent is more
flexible for researchers, but it might be ethically problematic. Participants
71.
Besides the three different types of informed consent, the PCSBI also names the
fourth category— participant-centric or dynamic consent. PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 89.
72.
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ICELAND’S RESEARCH RESOURCES: THE HEALTH
SECTOR DATABASE, GENEALOGY DATABASES, AND BIOBANKS 8 (2004),
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/icelandic_research.pdf. However, presumed consent only applies
to the databases of health information. Broad consent or limited consent is required in terms
of biological samples unless samples are taken from clinical care treatments. Id. at 11-12.
73.
PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 92.
74.
Rieke van der Graaf & Johannes J.M. van Delden, Exploring an Alternative to Informed Consent in Biobank Research, in HUMAN TISSUE RESEARCH: A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 15, 17 (Christian Lenk et al. ed.,
5th ed., 2011).
75.
Sigurdur Kristinsson & Vilhjálmur Árnason, Informed Consent and Human Genetic
Database Research, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC
DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 199, 213 (Matti Hayry et al. eds., 2007).
76.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (a) (2018).
77.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (d) (2018). Broad consent only requires general descriptions of
the type of potential research, the type of information or biospecimens shared, the type of institutions or researchers, the period of time of sharing, etc. The reasonable person standard
continues to apply to broad consent. See § 46.116 (a) (4), (d) (2).
78.
HUGO Ethics Comm., Statement on Human Genomic Databases art. 4(a)
(Dec. 2002), http://www.hugo-international.org/Resources/Documents/CELS_StatementHumanGenomicDatabase_2002.pdf.
79.
Kristin Solum Steinsbekk et al., Broad Consent Versus Dynamic Consent in Biobank Research: Is Passive Participation an Ethical Problem? 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS
897, 897 (2013).
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are not provided with much information before making their decision, so it
is questionable whether consent given under such conditions would be val80
id. Ethical abuses are likely to happen when participants provide samples
to be used without limits because they do not have the capability to foresee
81
risks.
Layered consent is a model meant to compensate for the problems of
blanket consent. Participants are given multiple options to give or refuse
samples to be used for certain purposes or to request re-contact for consent
to any research. The NBAC report proposes this model, arguing that consent
forms should be developed to provide subjects with a sufficient number of
options, such as: (a) refusing future use; (b) permitting only unidentified or
unlinked use; (c) permitting identified or coded use for one particular research, but no further contact to ask for permission to do further studies; (d)
same with (c) but with further contact permitted to ask for permission to do
further studies; (e) permitting identified or coded use for any study relating
to the original condition, with further contact allow to seek permission for
82
other studies; or (f) permitting coded use for any kind of future study.
Nevertheless, layered consent is criticized as too costly and too complicat83
ed. It is also criticized for its potential to hinder large-scale population re84
search by letting individuals opt out from the research. Layered consent
undermines the original purposes of revising traditional informed consent in
order to facilitate the use and sharing of information, as it may result in par85
ticipants’ decreased or narrowed scope of collaboration.
Despite the fact that broad consent has been generally adopted, it is ethically debatable whether broad consent can really serve as the mechanism to
protect and respect autonomy. The PCSBI finds that the majority of people
are willing to share their data and agree with the existence of DNA data86
bases, provided people can choose not to participate in the databases. Studies also show that most people want to be asked whether their biological
materials can be used in research, while at the same time people are willing
87
to donate their materials to support research. However, the exercise of autonomy is not expected to be too complicated and time-consuming, as surveys also find that most participants prefer to give a one-time general con88
sent. Alternative models to specific informed consent attempt to find a

80.
Kristinsson & Arnason, supra note 73.
81.
ELGER, supra note 68, at 59.
82.
NBAC, supra note 11, at 64-66.
83.
ELGER, supra note 68, at 79-80.
84.
See id. at 80-81.
85.
See id. at 71.
86.
PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 90.
87.
Leslie E. Wolf, Advancing Research on Stored Biological Materials: Reconciling
Law, Ethics, and Practice, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 99, 142-43 (2010).
88.
Id. at 143.
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balance between respecting participants’ autonomy over their biological donations on the one hand, and facilitating research that involves banked materials on the other. Models of informed consent all tend to focus on the moment when participants agree to join, but biobanks are a long-term program
in which participants are in an ongoing relationship with the database,
which differs from the typical short-term relationship between investigators
and subjects in the setting of traditional human subjects research.

2. After Consent: A Sustained and Continuing Relationship
A critical weakness of informed consent in the context of biobanking is
that it simply focuses on consenting to opting-in to biobanks or not. This
fails to account for the future-oriented nature of biobanks whereby participants’ biospecimens and data are repeatedly used by the biobanks.
One approach to supplementing informed consent relies upon other
mechanisms through which research ethics are ensured. Many scholars interpret open consent as having a different effect than specific consent. Open
consent does not mean general consent to the use of data and the risks and
benefits of research, but only to certain mechanisms of use and sharing of
biospecimens and data. Henry T. Greely opined that broad consent should
only be considered a grant of permission rather than an expression of real
consent and research involving biobanks should be reviewed by an IRB
89
with strict procedures. Singurdur Kristinsson and Vilhjalmur Arnason also
interpreted blanket consent to actually mean that IRBs should make deci90
sions concerning the permissibility of future research activities. Kaye and
Gibbons proposed that consent be given to an agreeable form of governance
and oversight of future use of materials; for example, a suitably constituted
91
data-access committee that would oversee future use. These interpretations
share a common emphasis on seeking an effective mechanism to protect
participants’ interest rather than just disclosing sufficient information regarding specific research.
Another approach proposes ongoing contact with participants after receiving the initial informed consent. Informed consent has been criticized
because it only provides participants a “take-it-or-leave-it right” whereby
92
they can either agree to or decline to participate. A study demonstrated that
broad consent had the support of a majority; however, people also expressed
a preference for opportunities to be informed about the use of their materials. People also expressed a desire to maintain control over, or at least have

89.
Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory Framework for
Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health Information, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 737, 762 (1999).
90.
Kristinsson & Arnason, supra note 75, at 213-14.
91.
KAYE ET AL, supra note 65, at 291.
92.
Evans, supra note 9, at 248.
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some input with respect to, their stored materials. Jonathan S. Miller proposed a model of “broad consent with recontact” in which broad consent
would be obtained from participants as well as permission to recontact
94
them. Through regular recontact, biobanks could develop a sustained interaction with participants, which would stimulate an ongoing discussion
95
between biobanks and participants. Participants could ensure that they
were making truly autonomous decision about the use of their materials on
96
the basis of updated information. Sustained interaction could also facilitate
research on stigmatized conditions because participants would be more willing to opt into sensitive research initiatives in a context of better understand97
ing and trust. Models that seek “dynamic consent” attempt to use technologies to facilitate communication with participants and to provide
participants with fairly specific options of types of research to support from
98
which they can choose.
These proposed alternatives to informed consent share a goal on shifting the focus from the moment of collection to the ongoing relationship.
Ongoing dialogue reinforces transparency and mutual trust. Maintaining
public involvement also helps achieve good governance and efficient oversight because both of these require public input and accountability to the
public. Ongoing communication is also essential for informing participants.
Sophisticated civic-minded participants could contribute to biobank projects
not only with their materials but also with their expertise concerning risk
management, value judgments, and the pursuit of general welfare.

B. Confidentiality and Privacy
99

Biobanks are often considered a threat to privacy. Surveys in European countries with large-scale biobank projects show that the use of personal
100
information in genetic research is a major public concern. While autonomy has been the major principle leading debates regarding confidentiality
101
and privacy, discussions on challenges of big data and corresponding new

93.
Christian M. Simon et al., Active Choice But Not Too Active: Public Perspectives
on Biobank Consent Models, 13 GENETICS IN MED. 821, 828 (2011).
94.
Jonathan S. Miller, Can I Call You Back? A Sustained Interaction with Biospecimen Donors to Facilitate Advances in Research, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38 (2015).
95.
Id. at 40.
96.
Id. at 40-41.
97.
Id. at 41.
98.
Chalmers et al., supra note 4, at 10.
99.
Salvor Nordal, Privacy, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC
DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 73, at 181, 181.
100.
Id.
101.
According to the PCSBI’s analysis, respect for person is the most essential principle for analyzing privacy concerns of the whole genome sequencing. PCSBI I, supra note 40,
at 21, 45-48.
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regulatory proposals suggest increasing awareness of the relevance of public
engagement.

1. Privacy Law Related to Biobanks
In the research context, the Common Rule stipulates that an informed
consent statement shall include a description of the extent to which “the
102
confidentiality of records identifying subjects will be maintained.” The
Common Rule provides higher protection to identifiable biospecimens and
data than anonymized ones. It allows samples obtained in clinics to be
stripped of identifiers and broadly used in research without obtaining further
103
informed consent and IRB review.
In the clinical context, the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta104
bility Act of 1996 (HIPAA) is the federal law most relevant to medical
privacy. Through the HIPAA, Congress delegates the HHS to enact national
data privacy and security standards, by which the HHS issued Standards for
105
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy Rule”).
The HIPAA and its Privacy Rule apply to “covered entities,” which include
(1) a health plan, (2) a healthcare clearinghouse, and (3) a healthcare provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection
106
with certain electronic transactions. If the covered entities engage with a
business associate to carry out their function to provide healthcare, the
107
HIPPA and the Privacy Rule also applies to the business associate. Covered entities are prohibited from using and disclosing individually identifiable “protected health information” (PHI) without individuals’ authorization,
108
unless some enumerated exceptions exist. PHI is “individually identifiable
health information” that is translated by or maintained in electronic media
109
or other forms of media. “Individually identifiable health information”
means that the information (1) is created or received by a healthcare provider or other covered entities and (2) relates to the physical and mental health
or condition of an individual, the provision of healthcare to individuals, or
110
the payment of provisions to individuals. Also, such information is individually identifiable “with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to be-

102.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (a)(5) (2018).
103.
See supra Section II.A.
104.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996).
105.
Id. § 264 (directing the Secretary of the HHS to submit standards of privacy protection); 45 C.F.R. §§160, 164 (2018).
106.
45 C.F.R. §160.103 (2018).
107.
Id. §§ 160.102–160.103.
108.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2018).
109.
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
110.
Id.
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lieve the information can be used to identify the individual.” The Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act
extends privacy protection: it addresses privacy and security concerns associated with the electronic transmission of health information and strengthens
112
civil and criminal enforcement of HIPAA provisions. To sum up, the two
major mechanisms of privacy protection of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule are
de-identification and subjects’ consent.
However, even if the health information is identifiable, the Privacy Rule
allows research use of PHI without individual’s authorization. A covered
entity is permitted to use and disclose PHI for research purposes without individuals’ authorization, provided that: (1) the covered entity obtains an alteration or waiver of authorization approved either by the IRB or the Privacy Board; or that (2) the use and disclosure of PHI is for activities preparapreparatory to research; or that (3) the use and disclosure of PHI is solely
113
and necessary for research on decedents’ PHI. A covered entity may also
use or disclose a “limited set of data” of PHI for research purposes without
114
authorization. A “limited set of data” is PHI from which certain specified
direct identifiers of individuals and their relatives, household members, and
115
employers have been removed. According to the Privacy Rule, banked
health information could be used for research without subjects’ consent
even if the information is identifiable under the above circumstances. The
Privacy Rules’ permission of broad categories of use without consent (including exceptions for research use) has been criticized for its departure
116
from the HIPAA’s origin of protecting patients’ control over PHI.
Another regulation applies specifically to genetic information. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) protects individuals
against genetic discrimination in health coverage (Title I) and in employ117
ment decisions (Title II). Although GINA prohibits misuses of genetic information by health insurers and employers, it is an anti-discrimination law,
118
which does not provide comprehensive data protection. GINA authorizes
the HHS to revise the Privacy Rule to clarify that genetic information is

111.
Id. De-identified health information is thus exempted from HIPAA. Id.
§§160.502(d)(2), 164.514(a)-(b). Information is de-identified either by statistical and scientific standards or removing enumerated identifiers. Id. §164.514(b).
112.
HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(d), 123 Stat. 226, 272-73 (2009).
113.
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2018).
114.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2018).
115.
Id.
116.
Deborah C. Peel, An Implementation Path to Meet Patients’ Expectations and
Rights to Privacy and Consent, in INFORMATION PRIVACY IN THE EVOLVING HEALTHCARE
ENVIRONMENT 89, 92-93 (Linda Koontz ed., 2013).
117.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
GINA].
118.
PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 66-67.
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health information, in order to regulate the use and disclosure of genetic in119
formation by insurers for underwriting purposes and employers.
The right to know and the right not to know are also core issues of fair
120
information practices. The question in the context of biobanks is whether
incidental findings shall be made known to participants. The latest trend in
121
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) and the Privacy Rule by the HHS moves towards granting individuals greater access to
their health information, in order to empower them in healthcare deci122
sions. The CLIA and accompanying regulations limit disclosure of laboratory test results only when the laboratory complies with the CLIA stand123
ards. A CLIA laboratory may only disclose laboratory test results to three
categories of individuals or entities: authorized persons, persons responsible
124
for using the test results in treatments, and referring laboratories. An “authorized person” is defined by state laws that authorize individuals to order
125
or receive test results. This definition means that individuals may not have
a right to gain access to their testing results if the state law lacks regulation.
The latest amendment in 2014 broadens the scope of disclosure such that a
CLIA laboratory may release completed test reports to patients by their re126
quest if the result can be identified to that patient.
The privacy laws just discussed do not specifically address issues of
confidentiality and privacy related to biobanks. The Common Rule draws
the line on identifiability in the sense that no participants are traceable and
127
no rights are violated. However, besides weaknesses in complete anonymity, another problem is that longitudinal studies cannot be carried out effec128
tively with anonymized data that is static and not updated dynamically.
Most biobanks code biospecimens and data and hold the key from secondary researchers instead of stripping identifiers permanently. Although under
OHPR’s guidelines coded biospecimens and data used by researchers with
129
no access to the key are considered de-identified information, the specimens and data are actually re-identifiable and the protection to privacy re119.
120.

GINA § 105.
Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 45 (Mark
A. Rothstein ed., 1997)
121.
42 U.S.C. §263a (2018).
122.
The amendment has been in effect since April, 2014. See CLIA Program and
HIPAA Privacy Rule: Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014).
123.
PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 95-96.
124.
42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(f) (2018).
125.
Id. § 493.2.
126.
42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(l) (2018).
127.
See Bartha Maria Knoppers & Ma’n H. Abdul-Rahman, Biobanks in the Literature,
in ETHICAL ISSUES IN GOVERNING BIOBANKS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 69 at 13,
17.
128.
See id. at 17.
129.
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lies heavily on security. The HIPAA and HITECH Act only apply to “covered entities” and cooperating business associates, which are mostly health
care providers. In this case, clinical sites collecting and storing materials are
covered entities. However, given the design of biobanks to share widely,
secondary users, who are usually distant from the collecting site, are not
covered entities. Nor does HIPAA apply when samples are collected by researchers who are not healthcare providers, such as in population-based research that collects non-diseased samples. GINA as an anti-discrimination
law has a narrow scope. It does not address many privacy concerns raised
by biobanking, such as autonomy over information and bodies, security,
stigmatization, and the psychological impact of research findings on individuals and groups.

2. Regaining Control of Information:
Beyond Informed Consent and De-Identification
Many of the characteristics of biobanks make privacy concerns perplexing. First, biobanks’ major collections are sensitive because of the genetic
information embedded in biospecimens. Moreover, biobanks are usually interlinked with other databases. The privacy issues of big data are rather
complicated and the risk is difficult to evaluate. Technologies that enable re130
identification challenge the protection offered by de-identification; however, informed consent does not provide a particularly satisfying mechanism
in response to biobanks’ new paradigm of data collection, processing, and
use. The means by which biobanks control banked materials are usually
complicated and alien to research participants, and therefore participants
cannot meaningfully exercise control over their banked materials. Participants also have little chance to participate in shaping research through giving informed consent, but much research concerns profiling or categorizing
participants. The current regulatory framework mainly relies upon the
mechanisms of informed consent and de-identification, but neither of these
provide satisfying solutions to the challenges posed by biobanking.
To regain control over information, several alternatives to informed
consent and de-identifiability have been proposed. One suggestion is to in131
crease transparency. Transparency provides information for participants

130.
Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010). Re-identification science involves
techniques that can unlock identities by discovering uniqueness in the remaining data, even if
administrators have removed any important identifiers. Scientists found surprising uniqueness
in non-personally identifiable information, such as ZIP codes, birth dates, and sex in US populations. Identification is possible through cross-referencing and analyzing these nonidentifiable data points. Id. at 1723.
131.
See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in
the Age of Analytics, 11 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 270-72 (2013); Julie E. Cohen,
Privacy and Technology: What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1932 (2013).
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necessary to decide whether to remain in the database. It also strengthens
accountability of the database operators and researchers. Omer Tene and
Jules Polonetsky underscore the necessity of disclosing the decisional crite132
ria of decision-making, i.e., the factors database operators consider. They
find the analysis of big data is interpretative, and factors decided by operators—such as the definition of the data set, the hypothesis, or the algo133
rithms—affect the results. The transparency requirement is argued to have
a legal basis on due process—individuals should be informed the basis for
134
decisions affecting their life. There is also a suggestion to increase accessibility of data. Individuals should have access to the collected data in a useful format and are allowed to let their data analyzed by third-party applica135
tions.
Another group of suggestions for regaining control focuses on building
trust in regulation. Compared to individual control (through informed consent) or technical protection (through de-identification) of information, this
group of suggestions underscores the function of institutions. For instance,
Yianni Lagos and Jules Polonetsky propose administrative controls as an
additional layer of safeguards to de-identification that could reduce risk of a
136
data breach. Control over information is realized through public trust in
institutions. Onora O’Neill proposes to build trustworthy institutions to supplement the limits of informed consent. Recognizing that individuals cannot
be expected to adequately grasp the uses to which their information is put,
O’Neill believes that the practical approach is to let individuals consent
137
based on trustworthy backgrounds. Paul Ohm also argues that while deidentification no longer ensures privacy, regulators should take many human
factors into accounts to balance privacy and countervailing values, among
138
which includes trust. Ohm contends that the loss of trust in technology
139
should be supplemented by trust in people. The law and regulation of pri140
vacy should reflect different degrees of public trust to different institutes.
The aforementioned alternatives share a consensus view that promotes
both shifting the focus from the initial stage of data collection to the later
stages of data storage and use and involving people in an examination of the
legitimacy of purposes as well as evaluation of risks and benefits of data
132.
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 130, at 271.
133.
Id.
134.
Id; Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 41, 43 (2013).
135.
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 131, at 264.
136.
Yianni Lagos & Jules Polonetsky, Public v. Nonpublic Data: The Benefits of Administrative Controls, 66 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 103, 104 (2013).
137.
Onora O’Neill, Informed Consent and Genetic Information, 32 STUDS. HIST. &
PHIL. BIOL. & BIOMED. SCIS. 689, 701-02 (2001).
138.
Ohm, supra note 130, at 1765-68.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
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use. This shift responds to privacy concerns raised by genomic research and
big data research, which are the main research approaches that benefit from
biobanks. Both these approaches demonstrate that privacy protection requires a collective view that goes beyond individual decisions. With respect
to genomic research, all human beings are part of a big family that shares
approximately 99 percent of genomic data. My neighbor sharing her bio141
specimens containing genetic data could affect me. The success of genomic research relies upon human biospecimens, and the benefits of research that unravel the mysteries of human life or promote progress in
medicine are usually beneficial to the general welfare; yet, big data analysis
also has a similar communal aspect because its privacy issues are complicated and transcend individual concerns. Threats to privacy from big data
collection are not just about the collection or use of each person’s personal
information, but rather about the privacy concerns raised by data aggregation and cross-referencing that can lead to the unexpected identifiability of
data or data analysis that results in profiling or social classification that violate the self-identity of data subjects. Results could also possibly be used to
categorize people in such a way that the value judgments underlying big da142
ta research negatively influence their public or private life. Moreover, genomics and big data usually interlink different sources of biospecimens and
data. Any individual could hardly have comprehensive information concerning how their materials have been used at the moment of giving consent and
thereafter. Thus, people’s decisions to share their personal specimens could
possibly affect each other because of the common human genome and the
interconnection of data.
Public engagement is highly relevant to privacy protection. Biobanking
and the research it supports utilize data in such a way that privacy is interdependent and individuals cannot protect their interests simply through their
143
own autonomous decisions. Effective privacy protection must turn to empowering data subjects. People should be encouraged to participate in de144
bates and policy discussions regarding the proper use of their information
and the value judgments underlying algorithms or results analysis. It has also been argued that if people could access data in a meaningful and engaged
manner, they would become a natural check on the inappropriate use of data
145
and encourage compliance with privacy laws. Barbra J. Evans also proposed to examine the collective nature of autonomy and self-governance of
data citizens because autonomy entails that people have the power to organ141.
Evans, supra note 9, at 250-51.
142.
Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 40 (2013).
143.
Evans, supra note 9, at 250-51.
144.
Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and
Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 52 (2013).
145.
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 131, at 269.
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ize themselves and defend their rights through collective bargaining.
These responses to the privacy challenges of biobanks all entail strengthening public engagement as a possible solution.

C. Ownership and Benefits
An important characteristic of biobanks is that benefits generated by the
scientific use of banked materials will not accrue to individual participants.
However, the great potential for deriving economic value from human biological materials and increasing commercial involvement challenges the
practice that donors of biospecimens and data have no rights over benefits
generated from research. Benefit-sharing proposes a new paradigm to answer questions of unfairness, as subjects or donors are not recognized as
owners of innovations generated from their biospecimens and data. Nevertheless, benefit-sharing alone does not solve the ethical question of distributive injustice. A just mechanism of benefit-sharing requires deliberation
through public engagement.

1. Controversies over Property Rights
The question of who owns our bodies—whether we have property
rights over our tissues and genetic and health information—raises many debates in the context of biobanks. Traditionally, the human body and body
parts were not treated as property because they were of neither biomedical
147
nor commercial values. It is the modern biomedical applications, such as
organ transplantation and human subjects research, that utilize the human
148
body and grant individuals proprietary values in their bodies. Biobanks
further complicate the issue because the purpose of biobanks is to share and
transmit data, a purpose which conflicts with the exclusivity of property
rights.
United States’ courts have decided against patients’ claim to property
rights over human biological materials used in research. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, a patient claimed ownership over cells
removed from his body later used in lucrative research; however, the court
149
rejected the ownership argument. The UCLA physician researchers who
treated Moore were only liable to the extent that they failed to obtain in150
formed consent by failing to disclose that they were engaged in research.

146.
Evans, supra note 9, at 247.
147.
See Remigius N. Nwabueze, Legal Paradigms of Human Tissues, in HUMAN
TISSUE RESEARCH: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES,
supra note 74, at 87-88.
148.
Id. at 88.
149.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487 (Cal. 1990).
150.
Id. at 480.
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Later in Washington University v. Catalona, the court rejected the claim
that participants have rights over samples they donate to biobanks. In spite
of participants’ right to withdraw, the right did not equate to a right to con152
trol and use the excised biological materials. The court also recognized
that medical research can only advance if access to these materials by the
153
scientific community is not thwarted by private agendas. Catalona
sparked debate over patients’ rights versus scientific research in terms of
property rights—assuming that there is property right over human tissues,
154
whether donation extinguishes the right. Critics of Catalona argue for donors’ rights, believing Catalona is grounded in paternalistic ideas and un155
fairly bars patients from deciding how to use their own excised tissues.
Those who defend patients’ property rights believe that, without such rights,
patients’ voices would not be heard by universities or biotechnology enter156
prises. Furthermore, patients’ loss of control over the downstream uses of
their samples, and their skepticism about commercial exploitation of their
157
biological materials, would ruin public trust.
The traditional practice favoring scientists and denying participants’
contribution is questionable. Robert Mitchell describes participants as con158
tributing “clinical labor” to a biobank. Moreover, denying participants’
control over their biospecimens does not necessarily promote free access for
scientific innovation. Participants who request to withdraw usually have not
done so for proprietary benefits but instead in the interest of saving their biospecimens from commercial exploitation or research viewed to be deni159
grating to certain racial or ethnic backgrounds. Taken together, these controversies prove that the notion of property rights cannot appropriately
address the distributive justice issues raised by biobanks.

2. Benefit-Sharing and Distributive Justice
Benefit-sharing is proposed as a new alternative for distribution between donors and users. This idea dates back to the Rio Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) of 1992, which is an attempt to acknowledge the contributions of local people with a more inclusive and nuanced view to assess their

151.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F. 3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
152.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
153.
Id. at 1002.
154.
DONNA DICKENSON, BODY SHOPPING: THE ECONOMY FUELLED BY FLESH AND
BLOOD 124 (2008).
155.
See id. at 120.
156.
See id. at 127.
157.
Id. at 128-29.
158.
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 333-34.
159.
Wolf, supra note 87, at 118.
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contribution. The CBD addresses the risk of exploitation of biodiversity
and traditional knowledge and calls the recognition of contributions of local
people; however, the CBD also implicitly assumes that natural resources or
traditional knowledge could be subject to ownership rather than commons
161
that is free for taking. The application of the CBD to human genome
could be problematic because human genome cannot be owned by anyone,
as the Human Genome Organization (HUGO) declared that human genome
162
as a common heritage of humanity. Neither could people be considered to
make contributions to research simply because they own certain genes.
It could be argued that benefit-sharing both addresses the conflicts of
interests and fulfills the demands of redistributive justice as well. To whom
the benefits of biobanking should flow and what the benefits are require further examination. The whole community, instead of individuals, is considered to be the appropriate subject to be rewarded in order to prevent contro163
versies regarding the property right and undue inducement. As for what
benefits to share, the HUGO Ethics Committee considered that the benefits
are not identical with proprietary profits, but should be determined based on
164
needs, values, priorities and cultural expectations. Benefits could be
shared in the other forms besides financial interests, such as access to
165
healthcare or public dissemination of research results. The ideas of sharing with the community and sharing both proprietary and non-proprietary
benefits imply that benefit-sharing is based on equity, not on recognition of
166
subjects’ proprietary right over their donations.
Benefit-sharing seems to provide justification for the biobank mechanism, but it does not constructively deal with the conflict of interest between
participants and researchers. An access fee is usually required to be paid by
users— researchers of banked materials and data— especially those who
seek commercial benefits. However, the question remains as to whether users could be required to pay back more than access fees. An empirical study
finds that practitioners around the world, despite agreeing that certain benefit-sharing schemes should exist, have little consensus on how such schemes
167
should operate. Because benefit-sharing provides social compensation and

See Kadri Simm, Benefit-Sharing and Biobanks, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE
supra note 75, at 159, 160 n. 4, 161.
161.
See id.; Cori Hayden, Taking as Giving: Bioscience, Exchange, and the Politics of
Benefit-Sharing, 37 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 729, 735 (2007).
162.
See Simm, supra note 158, at 161.
163.
Hayden, supra note 159, at 746.
164.
Simm, supra note 160, at 166.
165.
See id. at 166-67.
166.
Hayden, supra note 160, at 742-43.
167.
Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra, Benefit-Sharing and Remuneration, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
GOVERNING BIOBANKS, supra note 69, at 217, 228.
160.
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acts as a foundation for public trust to biobank projects, the institution of
benefit-sharing should also be formed through a legitimate process. One of
the recommendations made by the HUGO’s “Statement on Benefit-Sharing”
also notices that “there [should] be prior discussion with groups or commu169
nities on the issue of benefit-sharing.”
Cori Hayden maintains that benefit-sharing allows for a new approach
of “giving-back” as the legitimacy of science, compared to the “speaking170
for” approach taken by social and anthropological studies of science. The
speaking-for approach recognizes that scientific knowledge not only depicts
the nature, but also represents or “speaks for” different interests in the socie171
ty. Based on the speaking-for approach, legitimate science requires inclusion of people to represent their interests, such as those public participation
172
initiatives in policy-making on bioscience. By contrast, benefit-sharing
represents a different model of legitimate science that research is something
173
that can “give back.” However, the issue of inclusion and political representation is as essential for giving-back as speaking-for. Benefit-sharing
does not pay interests back to individuals, given its origin from respect of
the local community or ethical concerns against undue inducement to research subjects; instead, benefits should return to the community or the col174
lective. Hayden argues that benefit-sharing does not simply address the
unequal relations of exchange, but rather it concerns the broader issue of
175
mechanisms of distribution and redistribution. The ethics of benefitsharing has to deal with the question of the forms of political representation
176
and the mode of resource allocation. Advocates of benefit-sharing by biobank operators and researchers have been paying less attention to the politics of distribution, which may result in benefit-sharing to be skeptically a
slogan to facilitate research instead of serving the social compensation duty.
A justifiable benefit-sharing mechanism is based upon a speaking-for democracy. Public engagement is necessary for justifiable distribution.

168.
Dianne Nicol & Christine Critchley, What Benefit Sharing Arrangements Do People Want from Biobanks? A Survey of Public Opinion in Australia, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE IN BIOBANK GOVERNANCE 17, 28 (Jane Kaye & Mark Stranger eds., 2009).
169.
HUGO Ethics Comm., Statement on Benefit-Sharing (Apr. 9, 2000),
http://www.hugo-international.org/Resources/Documents/CELS_Statement-BenefitSharing_
2000.pdf.
170.
Hayden, supra note 160, at 732-33.
171.
Id. (referring to Bruno Latour’s notions that “science as itself a ‘parliament’ or a
process of forging a new ‘democratic collective,’ ” and that “scientific knowledge performs a
kind of double representational act, bringing the realms of nature and politics together in one
fell swoop.”).
172.
Id. at 732-33.
173.
See id. at 746-747.
174.
Id. at 734-41.
175.
Id. at 747-48.
176.
Id. at 753.
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D. Public Engagement as a Solution to Ethical Challenges
The three previously discussed ethical controversies surrounding biobanks demonstrate that biobanks challenge the current ethical framework.
Discussions of these three issues suggest that it is necessary to empower
participants to have a more active role than their current status permits. Debates over the appropriate models of consent have gradually shifted the focus to establishing long-term relationships with participants and continuing
to involve participants after consent is obtained. Debates concerning confidentiality and privacy demonstrate that individuals have minimal control of
their materials once they opt in to a biobank project. Privacy is also interdependent in the context of biobanking where participants must empower
themselves through participating in collective decision-making rather than
exercising discrete individual choices. Debates concerning ownership and
benefits also indicate that a fair distribution of benefits requires a scheme
formed through public engagement. In fact, the importance of public engagement has been highlighted by ethicists and policymakers; moral and
normative calls for public engagement have continued to grow louder.

IV. Ethical and Normative Calls for Public Engagement
The current ethical framework cannot adequately address the challenges
posed by biobanking, but public engagement or participation has come to be
177
seen as a sine qua non for biobanking activities. The calls for public engagement have arisen on the basis of various ethical reasons and purposes
that are identified and evaluated hereafter. Further, the latest professional
and policy guidelines also serve as normative evidence in support of the necessity of public engagement. Such normative evidence further demonstrates that public engagement must be considered in biobanking regulation
and governance.

A. Ethical Reasons for Public Engagement
1. The Collective Nature of Biobanks
Arguments in favor of public participation take into account the defining characteristics of biobanking. One reason to favor public engagement is
because it relates to the national identity as well as to community benefits.
Advocates of biobanks have linked biobanks to the work of nation178
building with respect to the role biobanks play in reinforcing or shaping
the notions of nation, citizenship, and community. Barbra Prainsack exam177.
See Knoppers & Abdul-Rahman, Biobanks in the Literature, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
GOVERNING BIOBANKS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 127, at 13.
178.
See GOTTWEIS & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 10.
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ined three Israeli biobanks and discovered that they were designed to pre179
serve genetic components of the “collective body” of Israel. The three biobanks attempted to reflect the “homogeneity” of the population, conceiving
of the collective body of Israel as Jewish, notwithstanding the fact that 23
180
percent of the population is non-Jewish. Biobanks are a method for shaping identities of an entire community, and thus require democratic legitimacy, which depends on public engagement.
Other collective features of biobanks also demonstrate the importance
of public engagement. The effects achieved and interests promoted by biobanks are beyond the individual. Thus, participants must be involved in a
process of shared decision-making. Because risk assessment is difficult, this
aspect of biobanking also implies a need for public engagement. Biobanks
involve genomic science and data interlinkage, both of which generate uncertain risks. Nevertheless, these uncertainties are not simply scientific and
medical issues that could be solved through technology, but rather are issues
that combine complex scientific and societal factors. Public engagement can
open the process of risk management to different stakeholders beyond scientific and academic professionals.

2. Communitarianism and the Common Good
Another argument in favor of public engagement arises from the communitarian turn aiming to revise the individualistic assumption of bioethics.
The impact of research on groups is particularly relevant in the context of
biobanks whose mission is to sponsor and enable research to enhance public
health. The NBAC report points out the limits of an individualistic interpre181
tation for its failure to address group needs or group harms. The NBAC
report proposes to involve certain groups when designing research proto182
cols, because the research may have negative impacts on those groups.
Yet, paradoxically, biobank projects often use a rhetoric suggesting that
their benefits will come from personalized medicine or individually tailored
183
treatments and therapies. The communitarian turn is not simply based on
consideration of group impacts but also on the necessity of revisiting the relationship between individuals and collectives that has been a core issue in
184
public health.

179.
See Barbra Prainsack, Research Populations: Biobanks in Israel, 26 NEW
GENETICS AND SOC. 85, 85, 97 (2007).
180.
See id. at 97.
181.
See NBAC, supra note 11, at 46-47.
182.
Id. at 50.
183.
Ruth Chadwick & Mark Cutter, The Impacts of Biobanks on Ethical Frameworks,
in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at 219, 224.
184.
Id. at 225.
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The main idea of the communitarian turn is the common good, which
emphasizes public engagement over individual informed consent. A biobank is an institution constituting social assets and communitarian val185
ues. The common good perspective holds that a good life is maintained by
social conditions that make it possible to form opinions about what kinds of
186
life community members want to live. The common good is the prerequi187
site for the protection of individual freedom and rights. In light of the
common good, individual autonomy has been better respected and protected
by participants’ discussion of the common good influencing the priorities of
188
research use, rather than by strict criteria of informed consent.
Some even believe that there is a moral obligation for each community
member to contribute to the communal biobank project based on the common good. Rosamond Rhodes argues that society should institute obligatory
participation in medical research at regular intervals for all citizens, considering that human beings are vulnerable to injuries and diseases and contri189
butions of clinical research to the all human beings. John Harris proposes
that participation in research is a moral duty resulting from non-maleficence
190
and justice. Lars Oystein Ursin and Berge Solberg also argue for a moral
obligation to participate because medical research is usually “politicized”
through concepts such as citizenship, community, and patriotism, while the
191
reason to oppose research is also political. These arguments for moral obligation in medical research usually describe participation in research out of
192
a sense of community membership or citizenship. Thus participants
should be involved in a way similar to their exercise of citizenship, in a way
that goes beyond informed consent.

3. Good Governance
The third argument for broader public engagement is based on a belief
that participation is the principle of good governance. First, a practical consideration is the influence of participants and stakeholders, as biobanks rely
on the support of participants and many other social resources. Kaye et al.’s
185.
Erik Christensen, Biobanks and Our Common Good, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH
BIOBANKING 101, 103 (Jan Helge Solbakk et al. eds., 2009).
186.
See id.
187.
See id.
188.
Id. at 112.
189.
Lars Øystein Ursin & Berge Solberg, The Health Dugnad: Biobank Participation
as the Solidary Pursuit of the Common Good, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH BIOBANKING,
supra note 185 at 219, 220.
190.
Id. at 221.
191.
Id. at 235.
192.
Some hold the view that participation in medical research is a civic obligation, similar to paying taxes or military conscription; however the obligation is not legally compulsory.
See SØREN HOLM ET AL., Conscription to Biobank Research? in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH
BIOBANKING, supra note 185, at 255, 256-57, 261-62.
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empirical studies find that many practitioners of biobank research regard
stakeholders’ concerns as important, despite the fact that these stakeholders
193
currently do not have any direct role in the regulatory framework. Public
engagement is relevant because it helps those who run biobanks understand
and respond to public concerns.
Moreover, public engagement helps change the power asymmetry in the
current governance framework. Traditionally, research ethics relies heavily
on self-governance and lacks transparency. Critics to informed consent argue that this emphasis works to entrench power inequality between re194
searchers and participants. To challenge the current power asymmetry, a
new approach to governance needs not only to disclose information, but also
needs mechanisms for communication and representation to build partner195
ships with participants, such as including donor representation in the governing body of a biobank. Biobank operators’ and researchers’ accountability would be strengthened through mechanisms of empowerment, were
participants granted a more equal position from which to evaluate potential
risks and benefits of research.

4. Public Trust
The fourth frequently mentioned reason for public engagement is to
build public trust, which is particularly relevant for large-scale biobanks run
196
or sponsored by public funds. Besides the intuitive argument that trust is
important because biobanks would fail without the support of participants
and society, there are also several features that make trust crucial. First, the
operation of biobanks involves risks, safety, and security matters that cannot
be solved by technical advancement alone, for these are matters of intertwined social and scientific factors. These matters are also connected to the
notion of responsibility, such as questions as to whether biobank operators
and researchers can show enough trustworthiness to deal with them properly
197
and effectively. Moreover, while there are many purposes publicized to

193.
KAYE ET AL., supra note 65, at 291. Kaye et al. recognized that it is necessary to
consider stakeholders’ interests and concerns; however, they believed that granting stakeholders a direct voice in biobank governance may go too far. Id.
194.
Nadja K. Kanellopoulou, Reciprocity, Trust, and Public Interest in Research Biobanking: In Search of a Balance, in HUMAN TISSUE RESEARCH: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 74, at 45, 47-48.
195.
Id. at 51-52.
196.
According to a survey of four European countries with national biobanking projects, trustworthiness is the main concern among them. Respondents agreed with the importance of bioscientific research but were cautious about privacy issues. MATTI HAYRY &
TUIJA TAKALA, Bioethical Analysis of the Results: How Well Do Laws and Regulations Address People’s Concerns? in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC
DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at 249, 250.
197.
Cornelia Richter, Biobanking: Trust as Basis for Responsibility, in TRUST IN
BIOBANKING 43, 43 (Peter Dabrock et al. eds., 2012).
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promote biobank initiatives and some of them conflict with each other, such
as commercialization and public benefits, there seem to be no mechanisms
to oversee whether all the purposes are appropriately pursued.
Legislation has been a way to build public trust by forcing biobanks to
198
submit to management in compliance with ethics, yet legislation’s focus
199
on informed consent and data protection does not fully address trust. Trust
is not necessarily built through informed consent or assured by legal contracts. According to Cornelia Richter, “[t]rust is built through recognition; it
may evolve when people think and act similarly or loyally support each oth200
er’s otherness.” Richter argues that trust is based on social stability gained
201
from social consensus but not restricted to traditional life, and it should
take into account more than knowledge and consent by considering the
202
sense of uneasiness, fear, and need for security. In this sense, public engagement plays a role in building and affirming trust as a necessary process
to shape consensus and recognition as well as to form respectful relationships between different stakeholders. Public engagement is especially relevant to assuring biobanks’ public health purpose whenever trust is undermined by commercialization. Klaus Hoeyer finds that the health needs
pursued by biobanks are co-produced with social definition of and
knowledge about health and illness, while commercialization might bias the
203
judgment. Hoeyer thus argues for multiple decision-making regimes to
consider broader views and to prevent a homogenization of decision-making
204
according to a market-oriented priority. Public engagement could serve as
the mechanism for legitimate decision-making as well as providing check
and balance to commercial uses.
Paradoxically, critics of trust also originate from the perspective of enhancing public engagement. Critics contend that trust relies upon the authority of experts, making the assumption that experts are the ones competent to
205
know the correct answer and to make the right decisions. However, in reality issues regarding biobanks encompass genuinely uncertain and unpre206
dictable factors. Critics believe that trust-building is intrinsically in conflict with public engagement. A trusting person is “an intermediary state

198.
HAYRY & TAKALA, supra note 196, at 253.
199.
See Pascal Ducournau & Roger Strand, Trust, Distrust and Co-Production: The
Relationship Between Research Biobanks and Donors, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH
BIOBANKING, supra note 185, at 115, 117; Klaus Hoeyer, Trading in Cold Blood? Trustworthiness in Face of Commercialized Biobank Infrastructures, in TRUST IN BIOBANKING, supra
note 197 at 21, 35.
200.
Richter, supra note 197, at 45.
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 42.
203.
Hoeyer, supra note 199, at 35.
204.
Id.
205.
Ducournau & Strand, supra note 199, at 127.
206.
Id.
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between being knowledgeable and ignorant[,]” implying an abstention from
207
exercising critical and autonomous judgment. Emphasizing public trust
reproduces the asymmetry between experts and laypeople, implying that lay
208
participants are incapable of participating in biobank governance. Pascal
Ducournau and Roger Strand thus argue that democratic participation is
necessary in order to heightened the quality of scientific research as well as
209
to improve the scientific knowledge’s relevance to the general public.
Vilhjálmur Árnason also proposes an opt-out system with informed trust to
re-consent, believing that dynamic interchanges with participants offer bet210
ter conditions for empowerment.
The aforementioned ethical reasons that suggest the need for public engagement reflect that participation in a biobank project is not simply an individual choice, but also involves a citizen’s choice to participate in public
affairs. Features of biobanks indicate that these projects are the concern of
the whole community in need of a communal method of governance,
(re)distribution, and identity-formation. Given this communal nature, public
engagement is necessary, not only to achieve practical goals such as gathering enough samples or gaining enough public investment, but also to
achieve normative aims such as democratic legitimacy and accountability.
Some rationales for public engagement also contend that citizens have a
moral duty to contribute to biobank projects, and in turn contend that citizens should be empowered to share in decision-making. Such rationales link
biobanks with citizenship and thereby further strengthen the role of public
engagement in biobanking.

B. Normative Evidence for Public Engagement
An emerging consensus with respect to the necessity of public engagement is also evident in policy and ethical guidelines regarding biobanking.
Such guidelines also provide normative grounds for public engagement because they usually urge the relevant authorities to formulate laws or policies
211
employing their principles. They also serve as important references for
governmental lawmaking and biobank operators’ policymaking.
Public engagement has been highlighted in international documents.
The World Medical Association published the Declaration of Taipei on Eth-

207.
Id. at 118.
208.
Id. at 125.
209.
Id. at 129.
210.
Vilhjálmur Árnason, Scientific Citizenship, Benefit, and Protection in PopulationBased Research, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH BIOBANKING, supra note 185, at 131,137.
211.
WMA Declaration of Taipei on Ethical Considerations Regarding Health Databases and Biobanks, WORLD MED. ASS’N para. 24 (Oct. 2016), https://www.wma.net/
policies-post/wma-declaration-of-taipei-on-ethical-considerations-regarding-health-databasesand-biobanks/; UNESCO Int’l Bioethics Comm., Report of the IBC on Big Data and Health,
para. 117, U.N. Doc. SHS/YES/IBC-24/17/3 Rev.2 (Sept. 15, 2017).
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ical Considerations Regarding Health Databases and Biobanks (Declaration
212
of Taipei) in 2016. Based on ethical principles governing human subjects
research, the Declaration of Taipei noted that large-scale databases collecting biospecimens and data have the potential to promote new research strat213
egies but also create risks for misuse and abuse of those databases. The
Declaration of Taipei intended to find an ethical standard that would take
into account the research participants’ willingness and trust in addition to
214
ensuring a high standard of protection of their rights. In addition to the
right to consent, the Declaration also explicitly declared that participants
215
have a right of access to their data as well as the right to correct it. Moreover, the Declaration requires databases to be responsible to the whole
community rather than simply to participants. Principles of good governance espoused in the Declaration exhibit a broad scope that goes beyond database participants: transparency requires that relevant information be available to the public; participation and inclusion requires database operators to
involve participants as well as their communities; and accountability re216
quires responsiveness to all stakeholders. The mandate to be accountable
to the general public reflects the communal nature of databases such as biobanks that have purposes and benefits that affect the entire public.
The International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization also underscored the im217
portance of public engagement in its report on big data and health. The
report proposed that biobanks or large databases designed for broad future
218
research adopt “dynamic consent.” Dynamic consent empowers partici219
pants to monitor data with the help of information technology. Participants are involved in an ongoing fashion and they can “vote for” or opt out
of research depending on whether they support it—this turns the project into
a joint enterprise between participants and researchers and lowers the risk of
220
exploitation. The IBC also deemed citizen involvement or engagement to
be an element of good governance that would prevent the exploitation, ma221
nipulation, or improper control of data. Citizen involvement is not simply
a preferable approach for protecting individual rights. The report indicated

212.
Declaration of Taipei, WORLD MED. ASS’N, https://www.wma.net/what-wedo/medical-ethics/declaration-of-taipei/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
215.
WMA Declaration of Taipei on Ethical Considerations Regarding Health Databases and Biobanks, supra note 209, at para. 14.
216.
Id. para. 20.
217.
See generally UNESCO Int’l Bioethics Comm., supra note 211. The scope of this
report includes databases such as biobanks. See id. para. 51.
218.
Id. paras. 51, 55.
219.
Id. para. 55.
220.
Id.
221.
Id. para. 103.
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the problem of democratic legitimacy that besets most big data projects. Big
data projects or databases promise to deliver public benefits; however, those
projects usually lack a democratic mandate from the people in which the no222
tion of public good is defined. In light of the questionable publicity of big
data projects or databases, an ethical governance framework must guarantee
223
that a real public good is promoted. With respect to the elements contributing to good governance, the IBC also mentioned engaging participants
224
through various means such as keeping participants informed or involving
225
them in the design of governance procedures over service providers. The
IBC considered public engagement to be not only a safeguard for individual
rights but also a mechanism for oversight or a check on the publicity of big
data projects or databases.
Public engagement is at the core of the Precision Medicine Initiatives
(PMI)’s guidelines, the Privacy and Trust Principles (“PMI Principles”).
The PMI Principles were drafted by an interagency working group assembled by the White House, and their task was to consider and finalize an ethi226
cal guideline over the activities of the initiatives. Despite sharing certain
similar ethical commitments with other guidelines concerning biobanks, the
PMI Principles do not address much with respect to the appropriate approach for handling difficult ethical problems. The PMI Principles instead
articulate guidance based on the initiatives’ spirit—participants as part227
ners. The PMI Principles are based on an appeal to people to engage in
the science of medicine as active collaborators and to not only share their
biospecimens and data but also to participate in decision-making concerning
228
the use of stored materials. Epitomizing this spirit, the first rule of the
PMI Principles stipulates that “[g]overnance should include substantive participant representation at all levels of program oversight, design, implemen229
The second principle also stipulates that
tation, and evaluation.”
“[g]overnance should create and maintain active collaborations” among var230
ious stakeholders. In addition to citizen participation in governance, two
more major approaches for strengthening the partnership with civil society

222.
Id. para. 104.
223.
Id.
224.
Id. para. 109(o).
225.
Id. para. 109(q).
226.
Precision Medicine Initiative: Privacy and Trust Principles, NAT’L INST.
OF HEALTH, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/program-overview/precision-medicine-initiativeprivacy-and-trust-principles#precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles-6 (last
visited Oct. 8, 2018) [hereinafter PMI Principles].
227.
PMI WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 1.
228.
See id.
229.
Governance, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, para. 1, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/
program-overview/precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles#precisionmedicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles-1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
230.
Id. para. 2.
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are proposed. One is the empowerment of participants, which aims to improve participants’ understanding and to facilitate participants’ access to
231
their information in consumer-friendly ways. The other is respecting participant preferences—the PMI should involve participants in a dynamic and
ongoing dialogue on the use and sharing of data, permitting them to exercise
232
their autonomy in a meaningful way. Compared with other ethical or policy guidelines, the PMI Principles further propose concrete directions for
achieving public engagement in a project that operates a large-scale database.
To summarize, guidelines underscoring public engagement are supported by both normative and practical reasons. The importance of public engagement results from the fact that many biobanks or similar large-scale databases appeal to citizen engagement. The PMI and the PMI Principles
provide a key example of the connection between the two trends. The PMI
seek to leverage a highly engaged population, collect abundant data, and
233
“usher in a new and more effective era of American healthcare.” The PMI
234
also aim to reflect the diversity of the population in sampling, which
sounds quite similar to a governance body that is mandated to represent the
political diversity of the people. The PMI and other recent guidelines seem
to endorse the approach of people-powered science in which people work
together to assemble large-scale resources for research and also enjoy a cer235
tain degree of self-governance. Here, self-governing means not only rights
but also responsibilities to actively participate. Another reason for participation is that the human genome is the commons, and people share mostly the
same genes and are interdependent. Scholars describe the rights as well as
responsibilities as genomic citizenship—individuals have rights and responsibilities to access genomic information as well as participate in decision236
making on matters that affect the community or even the nation. Many
biobanks face ethical or financial challenges; citizens who are invested in
biobanks help to sustain those databases. The link between citizens and biobank projects demonstrates the relevance of public engagement. Participants as well as stakeholders, based on their citizenship, should have the

231.
Participants Empowerment Through Access to Information, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH, para. 3, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/program-overview/precision-medicineinitiative-privacy-and-trust-principles#precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trustprinciples-3 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
232.
Respecting Participant Preferences, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, para. 2-3,
https://allofus.nih.gov/about/program-overview/precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-andtrust-principles#precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles-3 (last visited Oct.
8, 2018).
233.
PMI WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 1.
234.
Id. at 2.
235.
Evans, supra note 9, at 262.
236.
Sabatello & Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 292-93.
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right as well as responsibility to join in governance or collective decisionmaking of biobank projects.

V. Making Public Engagement Possible:
Various Approaches
Given the importance of public engagement, the next question is how
people may become engaged. In the following section, I will review different models of public engagement. The origins and practices of these models
reflect an awareness of the limits of current research ethics and the need for
public engagement in the context of biobanks. These models not only propose different approaches of how to involve the public, but also reveal different views of how to incorporate the idea of public engagement into research ethics. A summary of the models reviewed appears in appended
Table 1.

A. Community Engagement
Models of community engagement can be categorized based on the
presence or absence of “teeth” (i.e., having the legally-binding power to enforce compliance) into group consent and community consultation, respectively. Group consent grants groups veto power and community consultation
treats communication with the community as a supplement to regulatory requirements for biomedical research.

1. Group Consent
The notion of group consent can be traced to the Model Ethical Protocol
(hereinafter “the Protocol”), which was draft by the North American Regional Committee (NAmC) of the Human Genome Diversity Project
(HGDP) in response to criticisms raised by advocates of indigenous move237
ments. The Protocol contends that group consent is required in addition to
individual consent because of the group-defining nature of HGDP’s popula238
tion research. The Protocol requires researchers to seek informed consent
through the subject community’s “culturally appropriate authorities where
239
such authorities exist” before they begin sampling. Researchers may seek
consent from the larger group provided the existence of a “larger identity
among the population” and “the existence within the broader group of entities that the population itself recognizes as culturally appropriate authori-

237.
JENNY REARDON,
OF GENOMICS 98-99 (2005).

RACE TO THE FINISH: IDENTITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE

238.
Dr. Kenneth M. Weiss et al., Proposed Model Ethical Protocol for Collecting DNA
Samples, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1431, 1443 (1997).
239.
Id. at 1443-44.
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240

ties.” Compared to the Common Rule, which only requires individual
consent without granting the group any role, the notion of group consent
further extends the notion of informed consent, regarding groups as the subject of consent. However, most believe that group consent does not replace
241
individual consent but serves as an additional layer of safeguard. Group
242
consent is described to grant a “veto power” to the study population, that
is, the study population has the power to approve or veto research protocols
despite consent obtained from individuals.
Critics of group consent target two major assumptions held by the Protocol. First, the assumption that these groups exist and could serve as an appropriate unit for consent (the Protocol expects scientific researchers to de243
fine groups by their sampling criteria ). Second, the assumption that an
authority exists that is capable of consenting on behalf of the whole
244
group.
As to the first of these, critics point to the complexity of “groupness,”
while the Protocol assumes that groups could be defined by researchers’
sampling criteria. Defining groups or communities is never simple or clearcut but comes with varying criteria. For instance, the Canadian debates regarding the definition of “community” in public health policy include at
least three divergent but overlapping perspectives, such as population, cul245
ture, and nation. The variant delineations of community reveal that the
246
definition of group is neither “natural” nor neutral. The subjective ap240.
For example, the Navajo group is one of the large populations among Native Americans speaking Na Dene. The Navajos consider themselves as an independent group with its
people and culture. There is a Navajo tribal government comprising a President and a tribal
council. When investigators intend to take samples in a Navajo village, they must seek consent both from the village and the tribe. Id. at 1444-45.
241.
See Richard R. Sharp & Morris W. Foster, An Analysis of Research Guidelines on
the Collection and Use of Human Biological Materials from American Indian and Alaskan
Native Communities, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 165, 177 (2002); Joan L. McGregor, Population Genomics and Research Ethics with Socially Identifiable Groups, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 356,
366 (2007).
242.
Richard R. Sharp & Morris W. Foster, Involving Study Populations in the Review of
Genetic Research, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 41, 41, 42 (2000).
243.
REARDON, supra note 237, at 100.
244.
Id.
245.
See Fern Brunger, Problematizing the Notion of “Community” in Research Ethics,
in POPULATIONS AND GENETICS: LEGAL AND SOCIO-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 245, 248-53
(Bartha Maria Knoppers ed., 2003). Community as population considers the group identity—
including race, gender and social classes— in relation to risks of disease. Community as culture echoes multiculturalism movements and policy, assuming the community shares similar
interests and advocates a culturally sensitive approach to health care. Community as nation
not only imagines the community as highly homogeneous and cohesive but also grants it clear
political authority. This perspective is significant regarding the aboriginal community since
the term “research” is usually synonymous with exploitation and group consent is supported
by both political empowerment of aboriginal communities as well as the federal multicultural
policy of respect for cultures. Id.
246.
Id. at 246.
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proach to self-definition is also taken up by aboriginal communities as a po247
litical struggle for their power and rights. In contrast, the Protocol takes
the notion of community as being able to be defined objectively and scientifically by assuming the group exists and could be defined by researchers.
This perspective closes off the possibility of open debates about the existence of groups and the appropriate way to define groups. Researchers’ authority of definition might even reinforce the colonial notion of race and in248
digeneity. In fact, the North American Regional Committee (NARC) of
the HGDP drafted the Protocol in response to indigenous movements,
whose primary concern is that the HGDP reinforces a colonial aspect over
249
their identity and threatens their autonomy. Yet the Protocol was drafted
upon a belief that groups can be demarcated and substantiated by scientific
evidence without involving broader societal and moral debates. Group consent thus does not provide a satisfying proposal for respecting group autonomy.
The more essential problem is that group consent might reinforce racial
categories from a biological basis. Skeptics to population-based research or
research based on race are concerned about the possibility that genetic differences might be used to justify discrimination against minorities. One argument is that health disparities among populations are complicated matters
that involve various biomedical and societal factors, of which genetic variation is only one. This view worries about genetic reductionism or genetic
determinism that overestimates the power of genetic research to disclose the
secrets of human lives and diseases, while neglecting other factors affecting
250
health status. Another argument contends that the racial category is not
scientifically significant but rather socially constructed. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee
et al. point out that the genetic variation within human populations is greater
251
than that between population groups. Using racial categorization in a research design implies an anticipation of finding differences between populations, but this anticipation is biased and may preclude more nuanced stud252
ies. This view also argues against genetic reductionism or genetic
determinism that understands identities as ascribed by science instead of by
253
self-identification. Some above-mentioned examples of how biobank projects have served as nation-building or as governance to reinforce national

247.
See REARDON, supra note 237, at 100, 103.
248.
Id. at 100.
249.
Id. at 105.
250.
Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et al., The Meaning of “Race” in the New Genomics: Implications for Health Disparities Research, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 33, 38-39
(2001); McGregor, supra note 241, at 362.
251.
Lee et al., supra note 248, at 39.
252.
Id. at 42.
253.
Id. at 52. As Lee et al. describe, this is a shift of explanatory power into genetic
discourse in identity politics. Id.

280

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 25:239

identity could be adduced again as examples of population-based research
being used to maintain or reinforce current social categories or identities.
Group consent is criticized because it either enforces categorizations by science or reinforces existing categorizations by providing scientific support
for them—both of which run contrary to the original purpose of group consent to respect participants’ and the community’s autonomy.
The second locus of criticisms directed at group consent surrounds who
has the authority to speak for group members. The Protocol says that researchers shall seek consent from “culturally appropriate authority” or “institutions that provide a useful focus for community discussions and consensus,” such as the tribal government or “informal authorities” like “elders,
religious leaders, traditional leading families or clans, or other people rec254
ognized within the culture as having authority.” Conceding to difficulties
in seeking candidate cultural authority, the Protocol encourages the IRB to
255
demand explanation from researchers about this. However, critics find
that it is difficult, practically speaking, to find the cultural authority if the
group lacks political structure, especially when the group in question is geo256
graphically diffused. A theoretical criticism also considers that group consent undermines variations within a group. Minorities or vulnerable members of the group are usually not well represented if they do not have equal
257
standing in the community. Group consent assumes homogeneity in the
group, yet even within a group of certain homogeneity there are still diverse
values regarding what is the common good.
A more fundamental question might be why a group has a moral right
to speak for its members. Here I argue that empowerment of participants,
rather than respect for communitarian values, is the real justification for
group consent. Most of the above-mentioned critics take issue with the
communitarian assumption, which regards individuals as self-identified
through their group identities and not isolated atoms. In this sense, individual autonomy remains the focus, which is also what group consent really intends to protect. Group consent may still be found to be unsatisfying because individual identities are too complicated to be simply defined as the
subject of informed consent. Neither does this communitarian assumption
provide solutions to conflicts existing between individuals and groups. Ad-

254.
Dr. Kenneth M. Weiss et al., supra note 238, at 1146.
255.
Id.
256.
McGregor, supra note 241, at 366.
257.
See Erica Haimes & Michael Whong-Barr, Competing Perspectives on Reasons for
Participation and Non-Participation in the North Cumbria Community Genetic Project, in
POPULATIONS AND GENETICS: LEGAL AND SOCIO-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 245,
at 199, 212; Henry T. Greely, Informed Consent and Other Ethical Issues in Human Population Genetics, 35 ANNUAL REV. GENETICS 785, 794 (2001) (mentioning that the federally
recognized tribal or national government is not necessarily representative to minorities within
its group).
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vocates of group consent mostly agree that individual consent cannot be
waived, but they pay little attention to the power structure within the group.
Granting the group veto power seems to be paternalistic or even morally
hazardous because group consent does not necessarily enhance individual
autonomy. Lee et al. propose to return to individual consent because the individual decision itself reflects values of collectives whom the individual is
258
embedded in.
However, the history of the Protocol as a response to concerns raised by
indigenous movements suggests that group consent recognizes the sovereignty of aboriginal groups against exploitation in the name of research. Yet
as Jenny Reardon argues, group consent in the Protocol fails to deal with
259
concerns of indigenous movements. Group consent only expands informed consent from individuals to groups, without dealing with complicated issues regarding the political and historical realities of colonialism and
260
north-south relations. Reardon describes group consent’s failure as the
limit of the western bioethical framework that is not able to pay attention to
261
fundamental questions of power. Meanwhile, despite critics concerns
about the definition of groups and cultural authority, group consent has been
widely accepted in the context of recognized groups, such as aboriginal
groups. Hank T. Greely also describes congressional legislation for a national biobank project as a form of group consent; for example the Icelandic
biobank obtained group consent through public debates and congressional
262
legislation, the HSD Act. Such examples of group consent are less controversial, not only because of their clarification of groupness and authority,
but also because these groups are defined by a political process that takes
various social and political concerns into consideration instead of relying
solely on the scientific perspective. To summarize the pros and cons of
group consent, the real purpose of group consent should be to empower participants by involving them, either directly in debate or indirectly by including their representatives in decision-making bodies.

2. Community Consultation
Community consultation has been recommended by many ethical
guidelines in the context of human subjects research involving communities
263
with cultural differences or different public health policies. The Council
Lee et al., supra note 250, at 62.
REARDON, supra note 237, at 98.
See id. at 98-99.
Id. at 124-25.
Greely, supra note 257, at 787.
E.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, MORAL
SCIENCE: PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 79 (2011),
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%20June%
202012.pdf [hereinafter PCSBI II]; 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL AND
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
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for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)’s guideline
for human subjects research also mentions that community consultation
supplementary to individual consent is advisable when “[r]esearch in certain
fields, such as epidemiology, genetics or sociology, may present risks to the
interests of communities, societies, or racially or ethnically defined
264
groups.” The UNAIDS/WHO’s guidance on biomedical HIV prevention
trials also considers it essential to involve the community in every major
stage of the research “in an early and sustained manner” through “a trans265
parent and meaningful participatory process.” Compared to group consent, community consultation has been generally accepted and incorporated
into the existing biomedical research ethics framework. According to the
NBAC report, there are two situations where federal regulations require
community consultation beforehand—when research subjects are enrolled
in circumstances of emergency and when research is carried out in Ameri266
267
Besides federally required consultations,
can Indian communities.
community consultation usually does not have a standard procedure. Community consultation could be implemented in the early stage of designing
research protocols and developing informed consent; it could also take place
in the post-research stage as a continuing dialogical mechanism to disclose
risks and benefits, to seek community review of research results prior to release, and to consider participants’ voices regarding the use of samples and
268
data.
There are several purposes that community consultation is designed for.
First, community consultation provides researchers with cultural insights
269
and publicity through communication with the community. Communication helps researchers develop a culturally sensitive way to go about recruiting and seeking informed consent. Researchers can also better identify risks

POLICY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IV, 30 (Apr. 2001), http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_
commissions/nbac_international.pdf.
264.
COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES
FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, Commentary to Guideline 8
(2002), http://cometc.unibuc.ro/reglementari/cioms.pdf.
265.
UNAIDS/WHO, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BIOMEDICAL HIV PREVENTION
TRIALS 2, 17 (2012) (Guidance Point 2), http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_
asset/jc1399_ethical_considerations_en_0.pdf.
266.
NBAC, supra note 11, at 8.
267.
An example is that according to the FDA regulation, when a research is considered
to be emergent, the IRB may require community consultation and waive the investigator’s
obligation to seek individual subjects’ informed consent, see 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (a) (7) (i)
(1996).
268.
Sharp & Foster, supra note 241, at 180-82.
269.
Eric T. Juengst, Community Engagement in Genetic Research: The “Slow Code” of
Research Ethics?, in POPULATIONS AND GENETICS: LEGAL AND SOCIO-ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 245, at 182.
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and benefits with more understanding of the community’s shared values.
Second, community consultation increases researcher accountability. By
providing an opportunity for community members to understand and debate
about the research, community consultation serves as an additional layer of
271
safeguards to participants and the community.
Compared to group consent as a measure to protect group autonomy,
the focus of community consultation is to identify the culturally specific
risks and potential benefits and preserve the special values and culture of a
272
given population. Eric T. Juengst argues that community consultation has
a pragmatic function beyond only operating to enhance the population’s
273
control over the ways in which its members are studied. The same criticisms directed at group consent regarding the definition of a group and the
reinforcement of current categorization are not as strongly made about
community consultation, because the “group” or “community” does not
have a defined role as a research subject does. Nevertheless, issues remain
with regard to deciding how to define the community and who should be
included in the dialogue. Increasingly internal diversity and geographical
distribution of populations reveal that there are not necessarily shared values
274
nor common risks posed to a particular group. Further, consultation has
been criticized as a process of researchers teaching community members in275
stead of communicating with them. Consultation without teeth also gives
the researchers unchecked discretion to decide what kinds of voices should
be taken into consideration. Community consultation puts the community
member in a passive and weak position, as community members do not
have the power to participate in decision-making. That community consultation has been widely adopted in some areas of research. This can be explained in part by the fact that it poses no real challenge to the existing
framework of research ethics. It merely adds a mechanism, with no mandatory outcomes, for researchers to take the community’s views into account.

B. Public Consultation
1. Public Engagement as an “Ethics Plus”
Approach: the UK Biobank
Public engagement could be seen as community consultation on a larger
scale of community. The following examples of public consultation are
mostly in the context of large population-based biobanks.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 187.
See PCSBI II, supra note 263, at 30.
Juengst, supra note 269, at 187.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 187; Sharp & Foster, supra note 242, 47-48.
See, e.g., Juengst, supra note 269, at 189.
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The UK Biobank is an example that incorporates public engagement into its governance framework. The UK Biobank is a nationwide project collecting information from 500,000 volunteers, aged between 45 and 69 years,
as a resource for research into common multifactorial diseases that affect
276
people in later life. Major founders are the independent medical research
charity Wellcome Trust (WT), the Medical Research Council (MRC), and
277
the Department of Health (DoH). Before the project was initiated, there
had been a successful tradition in managing large-scale prospective health
population studies with little contention over ethical acceptability, yet in the
1990s a public mistrust towards science and medicine arose due to a failure
of regulation regarding the mad cow crisis and genetically modified
278
foods. In addition to the ethical requirements of the HTA and the Data
Protection Act (DPA), the founders of the UK Biobank were aware of the
necessity of gaining support from both participants and the population at
279
large. In the planning stage in 2003, an Interim Advisory Group (IAG),
composed of experts in ethics, philosophy, law, science, and social science
as well as consumer representation, was appointed funders to produce the
280
EGF. Before that, funders also held a series of workshops and consultations on aspects of the UK Biobank proposals, and the results were sent to
281
the IAG to be discussed and considered in the process. With the advice of
IAG and opinions gained through public consultation, the draft of the EGF
was approved in 2006 and set standards to safeguard collected samples and
282
data used only in scientifically and ethically approved research. The independent EGC, formed in November 2004, was tasked with overseeing the
UK Biobank and to monitor and report publicly on the conformity of the
283
UK Biobank with the EGF. The EGC also intended to include a variety of
284
perspectives, including community and consumer perspectives. A series
of public meetings was held annually by the EGC between 2005 to 2009,
with short presentations, question and answer sessions, and publicity by lo-

276.
About UK Biobank, UK BIOBANK, https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/
(last updated Feb. 7, 2019).
277.
Id.
278.
Oonagh Corrigan & Alan Petersen, UK Biobank: Bioethics as a Technology of
Governance, in BIOBANKS: GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 2, at
143, 143-44.
279.
Id. at 144.
280.
The Ethics and Governance Council, UK BIOBANK, https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/
the-ethics-and-governance-council/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
281.
Id.
282.
Id.
283.
Id.;
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BIOBANK
ETHICS
AND
GOVERNANCE
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http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
284.
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https://egcukbiobank.org.uk/members.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).

Spring 2019]

Bank on We The People

285

285

cal media and the UK Biobank website. The EGF contains statements of
the project’s commitments to actively engage shareholders as well as the
286
society.
Efforts in public engagement reveal funders’ awareness of insufficiency
of compliance with regulatory requirements against a background of public
mistrust. Graeme Laurie describes the UK Biobank’s bylaws as an “ethics
plus” approach that goes beyond the standard laid out in UK law and inter287
national standards. Laurie indicates that the ethics+ approach resolves ethical controversies. For instance, broad consent becomes less problematic
because it is turned into an ongoing engagement by being articulated public288
ly in the EGF and monitored over time by the EGC. The ethics+ approach
taken by the UK Biobank incorporates public engagement into a part of its
governance framework.
Nevertheless, critics question whether public engagement has been used
more so as a method to mitigate concerns against the biobank project than it
has to take public opinion sincerely into consideration. Public consultation
by the UK Biobank has been criticized for its top-down, narrowly-framed
design geared toward deflecting public attention away from a set of con289
cerns and steering the public toward a stance of support. Fundamental
questions such as the necessity of biobanks on a national scale, commercial
involvement conflicting with public interests, or mechanisms of regulation
and enforcement were not consulted in the early stage. Critics find that the
assumption behind much public consultation views the public as composed
of reactionaries—those who are ignorant and whose concerns and distrust
290
are a kind of risk to be managed. There is also no public scrutiny of how
results of public consultation have been seriously examined and what their
291
impacts are. Moreover, there is no participant representation in UK Biobank’s governing bodies, and neither do participants have any legal rights
to be involved in governance after donations. The EGC itself has no power
285.
See MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL & WELLCOME TRUST, REVIEW OF THE UK
BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 8 (2010), https://egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/
default/files/meetings/Review%20report.pdf.
286.
UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK, supra note 77, at 3 (“UK
Biobank will seek active engagement with participants, research users and society in general
throughout the lifetime of the resource.”)
287.
Graeme Laurie, The UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council: How Valuable is
an “Ethics+” Approach to Governance? in NEW CHALLENGES FOR BIOBANKS: ETHICS, LAW
AND GOVERNANCE 239, 239-40 (Kris Dierickx & Pascal Borry eds., 2009).
288.
See id. at 243.
289.
Kathryn G. Hunter & Graeme T. Laurie, Involving Public in Biobank Governance,
in THE GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION: WHO DECIDES? 151, 154 (Heather
Widdows & Caroline Mullen eds., 2009).
290.
Corrigan & Petersen, supra note 278, at 152; Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at
154.
291.
Corrigan & Petersen, supra note 278, at 152; Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at
154-55.
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of veto in matters of research use; that decision-making authority is held by
292
the Board of Director (BoD). The UK Biobank’s public consultation has
been roundly criticized for expecting the public to be a “passive public”
293
prepared to be convinced. Consultations with a passive public may serve
as a smokescreen for “business as usual,” or the introduction of insidious
294
forms of control, or practices favoring the interests of certain groups.
The development of public consultation is also worth mentioning, with
regards to the role of EGC. According to a report evaluating the performance of the EGC made by an expert Review Panel in 2010, the problem of
EGC public consultation is that it lacks clear policy to handle evidence or
295
opinions from the public. However, both Review Panel report in 2010 and
later in 2015 concluded it was not appropriate for the EGC to keep serving
the task for external engagement or the advocacy role to the public; EGC
should rather focus on its main function on monitoring the ethics of the pro296
ject. The report somehow resonated with critics by objecting to the lack of
clear and effective mechanisms to consider public opinion and the tendency
toward promotion rather than real consultation. Moreover, the Review Panel
reports seemed to consider public consultation as a part of regular operation
that executive bodies should be in charge.

2. Public Engagement Through Legislation
Similar to the UK, many other countries have faced the challenges of
ethical concerns and public distrust of science and medicine when establishing large-scale population biobanks. Specific legislation has been a common
approach to deal with public concerns. Specific legislation is supposed to
represent the consensus of the community regarding those ethical controversies. Public engagement has played an important role in the legislative process in some countries.
Legislation could be considered the result of great social consensus after public debates. For instance, the Icelandic HSD Act, passed by the parliament in 1998, authorized the creation of a centralized database that is
considered to be the consensus of the people after extensive public de297
bates. The HSD Act and the Icelandic biobank were formed against the

292.
UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK, supra note 77, at 13.
293.
See Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at 155.
294.
Corrigan & Petersen, supra note 278, at 155.
295.
MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL & WELLCOME TRUST, supra note 285, at 9.
296.
Id. at 1-2; MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL & WELLCOME TRUST, REVIEW OF THE UK
BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL REPORT OF THE EXPERT REVIEW PANEL 7
(2015).
297.
Margret Lilija Gudmundsdóttir & Salvor Nordal, Iceland, in THE ETHICS AND
GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at
53, 53; Piia Tammpuu, Public Discourse on Human Genetic Databases, in THE ETHICS AND
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background of a long history of carefully registered health information, the
acknowledged homogeneity of the society, and the supportive attitude of the
298
Icelandic public to the project. The Icelandic biobank’s ability to win public support was attributed to the initiator’s successful adjustment to the local
context, and the high reputation and trustworthy image of representative
299
scientists who played an essential role in convincing the public. However,
the public debate was a top-down process, in which the lay public was convinced by experts. The legislation was the result of persuasion. Some commentators disagree that the HSD Act represented community consent and
say it was flawed because great quantitative public support does not equate
300
“qualitative consent.”
Legislation can be the result of bottom-up civic movements. The Taiwanese Human Biobank Management Act (HBMA) is an example of legislation that was born under pressure brought by human rights groups and ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI) scholars on Taiwan’s national
biobank. The Taiwan Biobank is a large-scale population-based biobank
project launched in 2005, which planned to gather more than 200,000 samples from healthy adults to build a database for research into the interaction
among genes, life phenomena, disease mechanisms, and environmental fac301
tors. Meanwhile, human rights groups and ELSI scholars had raised ethical concerns over the project since the project’s planning stage. Their concerns were fueled by several factors, including an increasing rights
consciousness towards information privacy against government surveillance, and the collection and convergence of personal information. Research
scandals had occurred in hospitals and in rural and aboriginal villages where
researchers collected samples deceptively without obtaining informed con302
sent. There was growing mistrust of commercial exploitation of human
303
samples and data. Although an ethical/legal governance framework simi304
lar to the EGF of the UK Biobank was drafted in the planning stage, the
project continued to face strong opposition when it planned to collect blood
samples in 2009, as opponents decried the project as unethical and lacking

GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 73, at
73, 75.
298.
Gudmundsdóttir & Nordal, supra note 295, at 53.
299.
Tammpuu, supra note 297, at 74.
300.
Id. at 75-76.
301.
Chien-Te Fan et al., Taiwan Biobank: A Project Aiming to Aid Taiwan’s Transition
into a Biomedical Island, 9 PHARMACOGENOMICS 235, 235-38 (2008).
302.
See Hung-En Liu & Terence Hua Tai, Public Trust, Commercialisation, and Benefit Sharing, in HUMAN GENETIC BIOBANKS IN ASIA: POLITICS OF TRUST AND SCIENTIFIC
ADVANCEMENT 28, 31-33 (Margret Sleeboom-Faulkner ed., 2009).
303.
Id. at 29.
304.
See Fan et al., supra note 301, at 237.
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305

in social consensus. Being confronted with strong objections on ethical,
legal, and democratic fronts, the HBMA was passed in 2010 to address the
306
absence of biobank regulation. Compared to a top-down approach to the
regulation of life science and technology that favors economic benefits over
ethics, something often associated with East Asian countries, the HBMA
represents a turn in the direction of forming political consensus as the basis
307
of biotechnology regulation.
Nevertheless, the HBMA does not completely resolve human rights
groups’ and ELSI scholars’ concerns about the Taiwan Biobank. The passage of the HBMA does not amount to community consent to the Taiwan
Biobank in the way that the Icelandic HSD Act did. The HBMA is designed
to regulate all biobanks, not to authorize the creation of the Taiwan Biobank. The Taiwan Biobank project was formally licensed in 2012, fol308
lowed by the establishment of another private large-scale biobank. Moreover, the government plans to integrate the Taiwan Biobank with databases
of the national healthcare system to establish a “morbid health cloud,”
309
which also raises strong privacy concerns. The HBMA was born by civic
activism, yet it does not ensure the continuity of public engagement. Legislation by itself may not further public engagement, as the HBMA does not
include clauses regarding public involvement. The HBMA could even provide a foundation to justify the establishment of large-scale biobanks in the
future.
Another noteworthy observation is the gap between human rights
groups, ELSI groups, and the general lay public. It has been found that the
general public has not been made quite aware of ethical problems surrounding the national biobanks, as surveys usually show a majority support for
310
the Taiwan Biobank. The gap between advocates and the general public

305.
Jingyi Liu & Hongen Liu, েৱમಛ ൽᒷഝ [Taiwan’s Biological Database is Deserted], CITIZENS’ F. TO WATCH TAIWAN BIOBANK: BLOG (MAY 7, 2009),
http://biobankforum.blogspot.com/2009/05/blog-post_06.html.
306.
Chin-Yi Liu, The Biobank Act as a Route to Responsible Research: A First Step for
Taiwan? 110 J. FORMOSAN MED. ASS’N 129, 129 (2011).
307.
See JOSEPH WONG, BETTING ON BIOTECH: INNOVATION AND THE LIMITS OF
ASIA’S DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 152-53 (2011).
308.
See Qui Yizhen, த௭℉எ᧣ᬤ৮৸ᚷ੦ৱમಛ [National Gene Database
Surpassing Privacy Disputes],TAIWAN ASS’N FOR HUM. RTS. (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:13 AM),
https://www.tahr.org.tw/node/1141.
309.
Chin-Yi Liu, ୰ଙ೨์ ᝥ૰ඓ৸ড় [Morbid Health Cloud will Overly Surveil
the Citizens], APPLE DAILY (Sep. 20, 2013), http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/
article/headline/20130920/35307667/.
310.
According to a survey by the Academic Sinica, in Taiwan in 2006 (which is the
latest quantitative result among the public released surveys), more than 80% of respondents
knew little or never heard about biobanks, but around 70-80% of respondents supported largescale biobank projects; however, when respondents were reminded of the privacy risk, more
than 50% hesitated to donate their blood samples to the biobank project. See GENETIC
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raises the question of whether this seemingly bottom-up model really
amounts to a robust civil society.

3. Public Engagement by Mini-Publics
A team at the W. Maurice Center for Applied Ethics at the University of
British Columbia (UBC) has experimented with different ways of public
311
engagement in a Genome Canada and Genome BC -sponsored research
312
project. The UBC team conducted a study of deliberative democracy to
assess whether public engagement could go beyond collecting raw public
perceptions to involving participants in deliberation based on sufficient in313
formation and diverse views. The team recruited a small group of demographically stratified participants by randomly contacting households in five
314
health regions in British Columbia. Twenty-one participants participated
fully in the deliberative event known as the “BC Biobank Deliberation” in
315
April and May 2007. The event was divided into two weekends. Partici316
pants received a booklet of introduction on biobanking in advance. The
first weekend was to provide background information and develop the con317
text of communication. Participants first listened to presentations by experts and stakeholders regarding science practices, ethical issues, and com318
mercial benefits and then began to discuss. Participants were divided into
three small groups to identify their hopes and concerns regarding biobanks

RESEARCH AND PUBLIC OPINION: SURVEY INTERVIEW AND DATABASE IN TAIWAN (III) 8,
26-27 (2006), https://srda.sinica.edu.tw/datasearch_detail.php?id=879.
311.
Genome Canada is an organization sponsored by the Canadian government that
invests in genomic research and helps commercialization of research results. See About,
GENOMECANADA, http://www.genomecanada.ca/en/about/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). Genome BritishColumbia (BC) is a non-profit organization sponsored by the BC Province government and the Canadian government. The main purpose is to develop a platform for genomic research that will bring benefits to the BC community, Who We Are, GENOME
BRITISHCOLUMBIA, http://www.genomebc.ca/about/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
312.
Michael Burgess et al., Biobanking in British Columbia: Discussions of the Future
of Personalized Medicine through Deliberative Public Engagement, 5 PERSONALIZED MED.
285, 286 (2008). See generally K.C. O’Doherty & M.M. Burgess, Engaging the Public on
Biobanks: Outcomes of the BC Biobank Deliberation, 12 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 203, 20315 (2009); David M. Secko et al., Informed Consent in Biobank Research: A Deliberative Approach to the Debate, 68 SOC. SOCI. & MED. 781, 781-89 (2009); Heather L. Walmsley, Mad
Scientists Bend the Frame of Biobank Governance in British Columbia, 5 J. PUB.
DELIBERATION 1, 7-22 (2009); Heather L. Walmsley, Stock Options, Tax Credits or Employment Contracts Please! The Value of Deliberative Public Disagreement about Human Tissue
Donation, 73 SOC. SOCI. & MED. 209, 209-15 (2011) for other descriptions of this experiment.
313.
Burgess et al., supra note 310, at 286.
314.
Id. at 287.
315.
Id. at 286.
316.
Id. at 287.
317.
Id. at 291.
318.
Id.
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and then presented their discussion results to the large group. The focus of
320
the second weekend was the design of a BC biobank. Participants engaged
in both small- and large-group discussions to identify agreements and per321
sistent disagreements. The BC deliberation is what deliberative democrats
called a mini-public—a microcosm of citizens recruited to discuss compli322
cated and contentious political issues. Such a deliberative event is designed to catalyze discussion among uninterested citizens by providing them
with background knowledge and exposing them to different perspectives.
Through this process, citizens are invited to reflect on the issue and change
their initial preferences in light of deliberation.
The design of the deliberation was intended to respond to many of the
criticisms leveled at the public consultation done by the UK Biobank: chiefly, that it was a method to steer the public toward acceptance rather than to
involve the community in honest communication. The BC Biobank Deliberation was conducted by an organization independent of any institution
323
committed to the establishment of or investment in biobanking. The deliberation preserved the option of “no biobank” for participants and was
324
open to challenging the assumptions set by organizers. Participants defined issues that they believed to be relevant in the first weekend, being free
from issues narrowly framed by organizers. Their task was to explore broad325
ly and express their hopes and concerns about a biobank in BC. Organizers also worked carefully to avoid the trap of a “captured voice,” whereby
participants are unduly influenced by overexposure to certain perspec326
tives. Strict time limits were observed in presentations of background
knowledge by experts and stakeholders on the very first day, and through
327
the remaining days, participants did not directly contact these speakers.
The results of deliberation showed that participants’ opinions remained di328
vergent despite certain changes from their initial positions. This gives evidence that participants were not captured.
However, while the mini-publics model has the advantage of staging informed public debates and giving voice to ordinary, varied citizens, the
question of its impact on policy remains unclear. The conclusions of the BC
Deliberation recognized that their own opinions cannot be truly representa319.
Id. at 290-93.
320.
Id.
321.
Id. at 291-92.
322.
JOHN S. DRYZEK, FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS OF DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE
155 (2010).
323.
O’Doherty & Burgess, supra note 312, at 204.
324.
Id; Walmsley, Mad Scientists Bend the Frame of Biobank Governance in British
Columbia, supra note 312, at 11.
325.
O’Doherty & Burgess, supra note 312, at 212-13.
326.
Burgess et al., supra note 312, at 287, 289.
327.
Id. at 287, 289.
328.
Id. at 294.
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tive of the whole BC population, but their deliberative engagement may
329
contribute to trustworthy governance. The UBC team also said they would
help transfer the results of the deliberation into policies, and a final report
330
was sent to several federal agencies. The result of the Deliberation served
as a frame of reference for policy-makers without having a binding effect,
but it was decided that it should be seriously considered given its legitimacy
born of civic deliberation. Observers also find deliberative engagement is
supplementary to informed consent, as it helps individual participants con331
sider and reflect on broader interests than just their own. Deliberative engagement can also contribute to political legitimacy, as there are decreased
concerns about future use and the right to withdraw after deliberation has
332
taken place.
The BC experiment was not a completely new idea, as experiments like
mini-publics have been used in other situations. But conducting a minipublic for biobanking may be a somewhat less obvious application of the
model, probably because the relationship between participants and a biobank is regarded as a contractual relationship rather than a form of governance or public policy that requires public deliberation. However, the question of whether the relationship of a biobank to participants should be
simply defined as contractual irrespective of its political implications is a
question that should remain open and be explored.
The BC Deliberation is also unique for its efforts to define limits for
and minimize the influence of organizers in order to preserve the authenticity of civic deliberation. Its results reveal the ability of lay citizens to understand and reflect on complex issues, and to participate in forming policies.
For instance, participants were found to be very creative, for example generating a sequence of policy alternatives for benefit-sharing and feedback to
333
donors.

C. Representation in Governance:
Shareholder and Stakeholder Models
A common problem of public consultation is how its results or conclusions can be translated into formal recommendations and influence decision-making. Being aware of public consultation having “no teeth,” the
shareholder model intends to empower participants through engaging their
representation in the governing bodies of a biobank.

329.
Id.
330.
Id. at 293-94.
331.
Secko et al., supra note 312, at 788.
332.
Id. at 789.
333.
See Walmsley, Stock Options, Tax Credits or Employment Contracts Please! The
Value of Deliberative Public Disagreement about Human Tissue Donation, supra note 312, at
215.
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David E. Winickoff proposes a Charitable Trust Model as a third way to
the address the controversies over whether genomic resources could be
334
commodified or are inalienable. The UK Biobank was designed with the
principle of “partnership” to alleviate public concerns about commercial exploitation, while keeping alive the potential for collaboration with indus335
try. Partnership is embodied by management structures for public fiduciaries, such as the UK Biobank’s commitment to accountability, the public’s
indirect representation through governmental representatives on the BoD,
336
public consultation, and the EGC’s function to advise the BoD. However,
the UK Biobank’s weakness in realizing partnership governance is that the
BoD has broad discretion over the distribution of banked resources, but
337
mechanisms to ensure the fiduciary duties of the BoD are absent.
Winickoff’s solution is to let donors be represented in the governance
of the biobank. Winickoff refers to non-profit corporate law as a supplement
to the charitable trust nature of the UK Biobank, arguing that donors should
be viewed as shareholders who are represented in corporate decision338
making. A concrete proposal to include shareholder representation is to
339
constitute a Participants Association (PA). Potential donors would be informed in the process of informed consent that a PA would be formed, and
340
they could voluntarily sign on to join the PA. With a certain number of
petitions, the PA will be formed and leaders will be chosen by PA members’
341
proxy votes. The PA leaders will fill a number of seats on EGC, the IRB,
or even an additional Donor Approval Committee (DAC) to review research
342
protocols. Winickoff regards shareholder representation as a commitment
to procedural justice that outweighs short-term increased administrative
343
costs.
A revised version proposed by Kathryn G. Hunter and Graeme T. Laurie is to involve stakeholders, a more inclusive idea than the shareholder
model. These proponents of the stakeholder approach criticize the shareholder model from two aspects. First, they argue that the shareholder model
leads to donors’ self-interest, which is contrary to the UK Biobank’s aim to

334.
David E. Winickoff, Partnership in U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Property? 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 441(2007).
335.
Id. at 443.
336.
Id. at 444-45.
337.
See id. at 448.
338.
Id. at 451; David E. Winickoff, From Benefit Sharing to Power Sharing: Partnership Governance in Population Genomics Research, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN
BIOBANK GOVERNANCE, supra note 168, at 53, 60.
339.
Winickoff, supra note 336, at 61.
340.
Id.
341.
Id.
342.
Id; See Winickoff, supra note 334, at 450.
343.
Winickoff, supra note 338, at 62-63.
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344

benefit the whole community or the society. Second, they argue that the
shareholder model does not necessarily enhance public deliberation. Representation could help provide reflections on a wide range of interests for deliberation, but in the shareholder model representation speaks on behalf of
345
its own interests. Nor does the shareholder approach provide robust, in346
clusive, and transparent processes to facilitate deliberation. Donors’ representation may also cause the problem of vocal minority—that is, the replacement of one vested interest by another more recent and influential
347
group, while the voice of the general public remains unheard. On the contrary, a stakeholder approach would better fulfill the public-interest goal
with its broader inclusion of stakeholders, such as potential participants,
348
beneficiaries, and future generations.
A pragmatic issue with the stakeholder approach is how to involve
stakeholders. Laurie and Hunter examine the stakeholder participation strategy, which attempts to involve stakeholders through granting them an active
349
role in governance bodies. Yet this strategy is different from the shareholder model in that the representation is drawn from a wider constituency
350
and is recruited rather than self-selected. Laurie and Hunter find the strategy of self-selection unsatisfying because there is no realistic mechanism to
351
assure adequacy of representation. They instead endorse a stakeholder involvement strategy, which envisions partnership between management and
stakeholders by organizational commitments to direct and ongoing dialogues with multiple stakeholders as well as to respond and adapt their con352
cerns. Laurie and Hunter consider the EGC and the EGF’s commitments
to active engagement and public interests to be the basis of this ongoing dialogue, and they further underscore transparent procedures and the justifica353
tion of decisions with reasons to be criteria of this dialogue. To sum up,
the stakeholder approach not only seeks greater constituencies but also a
better quality of discussion to fulfill the criteria of deliberation. It may be
imagined that identifying stakeholders and their representatives could be
practically difficult and controversial, but Laurie and Hunter do not provide
a concrete mechanism for identification. Their implicit solution by appealing to reason-giving resonates with what many deliberative democrats be-

344.
Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at 164.
345.
See id. at 165-66.
346.
Id. at 158-59.
347.
Id.
348.
Id. at 176.
349.
Id. at 172.
350.
Id. at 172-73.
351.
Id. at 173 (quoting Norman Daniels and James Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability
in Managed Care Reform, HEALTH AFFAIRS Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 50, 61).
352.
Id. at 174, 176.
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Id. at 175.
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lieve: decision-making with justifiable reasons could complement the question of representativeness of the decision-making body.
Both the shareholder and the stakeholder approaches have what consultation lacks—involving participants or the general public in governing bodies through representation. This perspective originates from the assumption
of control over samples and data by recognizing that participants have certain proprietary interests. However, a transformation from proprietary interests to citizenship can be seen. Winickoff in his proposal of the shareholder
approach indicates that his approach aims toward power-sharing, which is
354
the premise of fair benefit-sharing. The stakeholder approach with a
broadened constituency and deliberative procedural requirements further
proves that the relationship between participants and biobanks is better addressed within a framework of citizenship and governance than cast in terms
of proprietary interest and contracts.

D. Patient-Centered Initiatives (PCIs)
The PCI is an initiative to empower patients/participants by establishing
patient-centered biobanks. The most significant example is the PXE International, which is a patient-run biobank established by a group of people affected with pseudoxanthoma elasticum to drive research for their treat355
ment. Another well-known example of PCI is Genetic Alliance BioBank,
an initiative that creates a patient-centered research network where biobanks
are encouraged to operate by the principle of community governance—i.e.,
participants control their samples and data by making decisions on the use
356
of research rather than passively consenting to opt in to a database.
There are also other programs adopting the patient-generated model of
database. A program called “That’s My Data!” helps patients contribute
their genomic data to researchers in exchange for open access to research
357
results using these data. This program is part of the citizen scientist
movements, which challenges the traditional approach of scientific research
as a professionals’ domain by encouraging citizens to participate in doing
358
science. There is also a mechanism implemented by “Consent to Research” in which participants can attach consent to their donated data and
359
researchers who are willing to accommodate the consent can use the data.

354.
Winickoff, supra note 334, at 54-59.
355.
Greg Biggers & Leonard D’Avolio, Address from the May 17 Meeting of the Presidential Comm’n for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Session 7 (May 17, 2012) (transcript
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A similar mechanism can be found in the proposal of a “walking biobank,”
that is, a biobank serves a network connecting participants, while partici360
pants are deemed as storage units of their own genomic materials. Researchers, when proposing a research in need of biospecimens and data, invite participants to “walk in” to donate their materials for specific
361
research. The rise of PCIs can be attributed to the growth of information
technology: PCIs usually avail themselves of web portal accounts and social
362
media to place participants in a position of interaction. The development
of information technology makes it possible for participants to express their
preferences that shape research in effective and economic ways.
The PCI approach has advantages in addressing legal and ethical concerns regarding biobanks and biomedical research. The PCI approach
strengthens and sustains public trust through participants’ involvement with
363
an understanding of biobanks and research. Ethical concerns are likely to
364
be reduced because of transparency and oversight by direct participation.
There would also be less need of anonymity because participants can be di365
rectly approached to seek consent for new research. Recruitment would be
366
more efficient and participants would tend to remain in the program. Advocates of PCIs seemingly believe that control by participants would mitigate ethical controversies and build trust in scientific research. They also
tend to recognize that involving lay perspectives produces better science by
bringing professional authority in contact with social values.
However, there are challenges to PCIs. A major question is the quality
of data collected by the PCI approach. Patients usually collect and contribute data when they feel motivated to and when they feel it right, but the collected data may not be large enough to yield statistically reliable results or
be representative of the whole population; plus, the opt-out option may hin367
der research. A more fundamental issue is whether untrained citizens can
participate in doing science, as patients’ interests and their choice of what
368
data to contribute may not coincide with what scientists consider relevant.
However, the clash does not prove that amateurs cannot contribute to science. Instead, it reveals that patients would present priorities different from

360.
Chalmers et al., supra note 4, at 10.
361.
Id.
362.
Jane Kaye et al., From Patients to Partners: Participant-Centric Initiatives in Biomedical Research, 13 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 371, 371 (2012).
363.
See id. at 371.
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Id. at 373.
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Id.
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Marus, supra note 357. However, advocates believe that patient-controlled data is
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362, at 375.
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those of scientific professionals, prioritizing what may have been ranked
low in the hierarchies of scientists, their institutions, and their funders.
The PCI approach provides a different perspective to describe the relationship between participants and researchers. The Genetic Alliance calls
patients the people, as they consider the patient’s role to move from partici369
pant to collaborator. PCIs have been advocated for in the context of scientific citizenship rather on the grounds of property rights, notwithstanding
that the PCIs tend to result in a small-scale database for specific groups of
interest rather than a large-scale population database for wide public benefit.
The PCI approach addresses what the existing research ethical framework
has hardly dealt with—the power asymmetry between lay participants and
scientists. The PCI approach challenges scientists’ authority in the realm of
scientific research by requiring power-sharing in both knowledge production and the distribution of resources.

E. Summaries and Reponses to Critiques
Two points are worth noting with respect to the overview of various
models of public engagement. First, the focus shifts from consent to participation in governance. In the traditional ethical framework for protecting research subjects or participants, consent is the main protective mechanism
and governance is the concern of researchers. Many approaches to public
engagement have sought to bolster broad consent by supplementing further
consent such as group consent by the community or dynamic consent. However, consent cannot really be voluntary without sufficient information and
discussion. Further, given the communal nature of biobanks, participants are
interdependent, which requires them to join in collective decision-making.
Public engagement in governance grants participants opportunities to be involved in deliberation with other stakeholders and to influence collective
decisions through which participants can realize their autonomy. By participating in governance, the general public is also more effectively empowered. Participating in governance enhances a citizen’s understanding and
capacity to make decisions. Citizens are also likely to gain stronger bargaining power through unionizing peers or stakeholders in any governing body
compared with when they give consent individually.
Second, the scope of public engagement seems to extend beyond a biobank to stakeholders or citizens in the community or the nation at large.
Earlier approaches to public engagement such as group consent or community consultation have faced the problem of determining who should be involved. Despite the complexity of representation, an emerging consensus
suggests that public engagement should not be limited to biobank partici369.
The transcription of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues
Meeting on May 17, 2012, in Washington, at 2-5, https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/
pcsbi/sites/default/files/Meeting%209%20Session%207.pdf.
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pants but should include other stakeholders. Even if a citizen does not opt in
to a biobank project, her rights may nevertheless be affected as long as her
personal information could possibly be used or identified through datamining, the interlinking of databases, or the shared human genome. Further,
many large-scale biobank projects appeal to the public good, use public resources, or financially rely on public investments. Citizens, as voters or taxpayers, should be considered stakeholders with the right to be involved in
the governance of biobanks.
Common critiques of public engagement are also worth mentioning.
One critique is to question whether citizens are competent enough to participate in deliberation, especially when research involving biobanks is usually
related to complicated scientific facts. Another concern is that engagement
would increase costs and become an obstacle to research. Still another critique is that public engagement would undermine the accountability of biobank operators or researchers. Analyzing the experience of public engagement in biobanking helps to respond to these criticisms.
Actual experiences with public engagement around the world have
proven the competency of citizens. The BC Biobank Deliberation demonstrated that lay citizens were competent to form guidelines for the design of
a biobank, and were even capable of proposing new mechanisms of benefitsharing that had not been implemented by any biobank. A carefully designed deliberative event for presenting various views and keeping topics
open could prevent participants from being “captured” by the organizers or
others. The biobanking legislation prompted by a civic movement in Taiwan
demonstrated a bottom–up model of participation in forming ethical guidelines. PCIs also hold a positive attitude towards citizen participation in the
process of producing scientific knowledge.
Another critique argues that public engagement would impose burdens
on biobank operators or researchers that would hinder research. Difficulties
associated with seeking re-consent would impede research, which is a main
reason that the Final Rule did not adopt the NPRM’s proposal to extend the
scope of human subjects research to research using nonidentified biospeci370
mens. However, similar concerns are not as strong for biobanks. Biobanks
today are institutional databases with professional staffs that could help contact participants or stakeholders, if necessary. Even if obtaining reconsent is
necessary, it is the biobank operator, not individual researchers, who shall
371
assume this duty. Approaches like PCIs that take advantage of information technology also demonstrate the practicability of engaging individual participants in continuing interaction with a biobank. Public engagement
does take time and money. Nevertheless, the cost should be deemed a necessity given its potential benefits attendant to public trust and potential
370.
371.

Berkowitz, supra note 14, at 956-57; Menikoff & Kaneshiro, supra note 16, at 613.
Miller, supra note 94, at 66.
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costs resulting from ethical and political queries. In addition, public engagement is essential in terms of risk management; it helps risk evaluation
and risk communication with the public, particularly with respect to the uncertain and complicated risks of biobanking.
Public engagement does not undermine stewardship. By contrast, it
strengthens oversight by requiring biobank operators and researchers to be
accountable to the general public. For example, the EGC’s duty of publicity,
including reporting to the public and advising generally on the interests of
372
participants and the general public, demonstrated how public engagement
by an oversight body strengthened the UK Biobank’s stewardship. The
Taiwanese story also exemplified how public engagement strengthened
oversight because the HBMA was born out of the pressure of a civic movement demanding the establishment of a legal framework to regulate an area
that had previously been self-regulated by scientific professionals.

VI. Conclusion
In the book Banking on the Body, the author Kara W. Swanson examined the metaphor of a body “bank,” which generated controversy over
373
whether body products should be considered commodities or gifts. Body
banks that were created by physicians for improving medical care originated
on the basis of the “civic property” view that contended that even if body
products were private property, they would be stored in banks in order to
374
efficiently support medical treatments. The metaphor of banks later
adopted the “market property” view whereby body products were consid375
ered commodities that could and should be tradable in a free market. The
title of Swanson’s book expressed the great potential for body products to
benefit medicine and public welfare; such potential could be further bolstered through efficient exchanges facilitated by body banks. Similar to
body banks, biobanking provides a mechanism for maximizing the utility of
biospecimens and data. However, considering that the success of biobanks
depends on public support and that its legitimacy is based on its contribution
to public good, this article argues for banking on the people in the context of
biobanking. Any sustainable biobank requires the involvement of the people, not simply as donors, as active stakeholders participating in collective
decision-making.
This article examined why and how public engagement is relevant in
biobanking. Biobanks are not just a type of new scientific practice for ac-

372.
Laurie, supra note 283, at 239-41.
373.
KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK,
AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 5-8 (2014).
374.
Id. at 13.
375.
Id. at 13-14.
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cumulating and consolidating resources for biomedical research: they have
too many major and complicated socio-economic implications. Biobanking
often contends that its objective is to promote the common good such as
public health or economic development. Biobanks are expected to generate
considerable economic benefits by serving as a platform for bringing biospecimens and data into commercial use. Biobanks could also serve as a
strategy to create or reinforce community identities. Many biobank projects
such as the PMI and its subproject, All of Us, appeal to genomic citizenship;
that is, people have rights as well as responsibilities with respect to participating in scientific collaboration that could benefit the whole community.
Given that the current bioethical framework focuses on the protection of individual rights, it is not up to the task of addressing the many complicated
issues involved in biobanks.
As this article has demonstrated, biobanking challenges the current regulatory and ethical framework, specifically in terms of informed-consent,
privacy and confidentiality, and property and benefit-sharing. It is not coincidental that public engagement is frequently proposed when discussing
new solutions to these challenges. A participatory turn is evident in biobanking, both ethically and normatively, and calls for public engagement
have been made on the basis of ethical considerations associated with the
communal features of biobanks. Normative developments, as expressed in
the latest domestic and international guidelines, have also included mechanisms for engaging the public in the governance of biobanks. Public engagement initiatives have been introduced to formulate ethics as well as to
involve the public in governance. These practices demonstrate that public
engagement is not only feasible but also gradually becoming prevalent in
the context of biobanking.
The ethical and legal challenges, as well as the participatory turn in biobanking, also reveal the increasing relevance of citizen participation in bioethics. In its first report, the PCSBI listed democratic deliberation as an
emerging principle when considering the social implications of emerging
376
technologies. The principle of democratic deliberation “reflects an approach to collaborative decision making that embraces respectful debate of
377
opposing views and active participation by citizens.” Later in the final report, PCSBI concludes that democratic deliberation should be used to guide
378
bioethical policy decisions. The PCSBI recommended that policymakers

376.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW
DIRECTIONS: THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2010),
http://bioethics.gov/cms/synthetic-biology-report.
377.
Id. at 5.
378.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, BIOETHICS FOR
EVERY GENERATION: DELIBERATION AND EDUCATION IN HEALTH, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY 4-5 (2016), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/
PCSBI_Bioethics-Deliberation_0.pdf.
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and regulators at all levels should be guided by the principle of democratic
deliberation when considering difficult bioethical issues and that stakeholders should be involved in discussions that aim to promote mutual under379
standing and respect. The emerging bioethical principle proposed by the
PCSBI echoes the participatory turn in biobanking described in this article.
Democratic deliberation as a guiding principle for addressing bioethical
challenges as well as the regulatory and ethical debates concerning biobanking, the wide variety of public engagement examples, and the rhetoric of
many bank projects that has appealed to citizens all illustrate the importance
of public engagement in biobanking.

379.
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Table 1: Models of Public Engagement in Biobanks
Model

Community
engagement

Community
consultation

Public
engagement

Representation in
governance

PCI

Involve the
public in
establishing an
ethical
framework and
governance
structure

Include
stakeholders or
shareholders’
representatives in
governing bodies

Patients have
control over what
research their
samples and data
are used in and how
their samples and
data are used

Group consent

Method

Obtain consent
from the subject
group in addition
to consent from
individual
participants

Communicate with
the subject
community to
understand and
account for its
culture and
opinions

Examples

HGDP Protocol

CIOMS Guideline UK Biobank:
NIH Guideline
public
consultation to
form EGF and
by EGC
Taiwan: civic
movements led
to legislation
BC
Deliberation:
small public
sessions held to
discuss the
design of a
biobank

Shareholder
model (the
charitable trust
model):
participants’
representation
Stakeholder
model: greater
constituency and
ongoing dialogues
with procedural
transparency and
reason giving

PXE International
Genetic Alliance
BioBank
“That’s My Data!”
“Consent to
Research”
“Walking biobank”

Provide cultural
insight to
researchers for
protocol design and
risk–benefit
assessment
Additional
safeguards
Disagreements
among the
community itself
Process of teaching
instead of
communicating

Representation
with teeth
Shareholder
model: speak for
participants’
interests
Stakeholder
model: difficulties
of defining and
involving
stakeholders
Vocal minority

Participants’ active
role in doing
science
Databases of poor
quality: small scale
and less
representative
samples and data

Strength and Respect for
weakness
group autonomy
Controversies
regarding
defining “group”
and “group
authority” by
researchers
Suspicions of
racism

Forming ethical
guidelines with
public input
Achieve
democratic
legitimacy and
establish public
trust
Uncertain
whether should
be top–down to
steer the public
or bottom–up to
respond to
certain active
voices
Without teeth
(UK, BC) and
unclear policy
impacts

